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ABSTRACT 
The mariner pool was not an issue of concern until Operations Desert 
Shield/Desert Storm brought about the largest fleet activation since the Vietnam Conflict. 
To meet Ready Reserve Force crewing requirements during the Gulf War, mariners from 
the Great Lakes and retired mariners ranging up to eighty years of age were mobilized. 
Additionally, Military Sealift Command had to hire as many as 162 foreign-flag ships to 
supplement its sealift capabilities. This raised concerns over the mariner pool and its 
effects on national sealift capabilities in terms of the national defense strategy. However, 
there is no organization that can state and validate the number of U.S. Merchant Marines. 
The objective of this study is to determine if there are enough qualified Merchant 
Mariners to meet the crewing requirements brought on by two nearly simultaneous major 
theater wars without sacrificing manning levels in the commercial fleet. Part of this 
project also analyzed the maritime industry to determine the causes of the mariner 
shortage. Although research did not yield the data necessary to determine actual size of 
the mariner pool, estimates suggest that the number of mariners available is not sufficient 
to fulfill surge requirements in support of national sealift strategy. 
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I.       INTRODUCTION 
A.   BACKGROUND 
Throughout its history, the United States has relied heavily on seapower to carry 
out foreign policy and stay competitive in world trade. America's ability to project its 
power to distant shores is assured by a maritime strategy that includes a superior Navy 
and strong U.S. Merchant Marine. A strong Maritime Industry is essential to our nation's 
success in the world trade market and is a crucial element during time of crisis when it 
becomes necessary to move vast amounts of cargo and personnel over great distances in a 
timely manner. Yet, this vital asset has been in steady decline for the last 50 years. 
At its peak in 1950, the U.S. Merchant Fleet consisted of 1,050 privately owned 
ships (Ref. l:p. 27) while the National Defense Reserve Fleet (NDRF) held 2,277 ships 
(Ref. 2:p. 56). Unfortunately, this vital asset has been steadily declining since then. As of 
1999, the U.S. Merchant Fleet consisted of a mere 281 ships (Ref. l:p. 27) while the 
NDRF consisted "of 258 vessels, primarily dry cargo ships, with some tankers, military 
auxiliaries, and other types of vessels. However, 85 are no longer militarily useful and 
others are slated for scrapping" (Ref. 3:p. 78). This is not to say the NDRF is completely 
useless, one of the subcomponents of the NDRF is the Ready Reserve Fleet (RRF), a 
group of 91 vessels that are one of the key cornerstones to the military's sealift 
capabilities. The RRF and NDRF will be explained in more detail later on. 
The gravity of this problem did not materialize until the U.S. began to mobilize in 
preparation for the Persian Gulf War.   When the Maritime Administration (MARAD) 
broke out the first 42 Ready Reserve Fleet (RRF) ships, it had to "comb union halls and 
retirement rolls to round up civilian crews to man them" (Ref. 4:p. 6).   To meet RRF 
1 
crewing requirements during Desert Shield/Desert Storm, mariners from the Great Lakes 
and domestic inland waterways, as well as retired mariners ranging up to eighty years of 
age, were mobilized. Also, by the time the ground war started, the military's sealift 
authority, Military Sealift Command (MSC), had to charter 162 foreign ships to 
supplement its sealift capabilities (Ref. 2:p. 263). This raises serious issues about the 
strength of the U.S. merchant marine as it pertains to maritime strategy, especially with 
the critical role the United States plays in world politics. 
America's industrial, economic, and military leadership propelled it to become the 
sole world superpower it is today. As such, the world often looks to the U.S. in times of 
crisis.  The U.S. must also depend on its might to protect its national interests and those 
of its allies anywhere in the world.   Nevertheless, it has neglected its merchant marine to 
the point where countries such as Cypress and Liberia have more ships registered under 
their flag.   Since 1970, many other nations have increased the size of their fleet as a 
means of projecting visibility and earning hard currency. While the U.S. fleet's tonnage 
has only decreased by about fifty percent, due to larger ships and containerization, these 
ships remain less than four percent of the world fleet by tonnage as shown in Figure 1 
(Ref. 5:p. 23). These statistics raise serious concerns about the lone superpower's ability 
to fulfill its commitments around the world. 
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Figure 1.        U.S. Oceanborne International Trade, 1921 -1992 - Percentage Carried on 
U.S. Flag Vessels From Ref [5]. 
The factors that led to these statistics have been well studied over the years. They 
can be narrowed down to several principle reasons. The level of protection for seafarer 
health, welfare, and safety are lower on non-U.S. ships. Safety standards enforced on 
U.S. ships are some of the most stringent in the world, requiring additional safety 
equipment and training compared to some of the flag of convienince nations. Double 
hulled tankers are now required for the oil carriers in Alaska. As the name implies, these 
ships must have two hulls to prevent oil spills, and are vastly more expensive than the 
single hulled vessels used by other countries. Another factor contributing to the decline 
is the regulatory framework in several countries, including key trading partners, which 
restrict free access, or otherwise permit discriminatory practices against U.S. flag vessels. 
This enables foreign vessels to operate at a lower cost or with substantial preferential 
treatment compared to U.S. carriers.   Foreign-flag ship operators do not pay corporate 
income taxes, and foreign flag crews often pay no personal income taxes. Additionally, 
the only U.S. corporate or income taxes paid by foreign flag owners are taxes paid on 
their U.S. shore-based facilities and personnel, which is often non-existent. However, 
vessels operating under the U.S. flag are subject to all the taxes and regulatory laws 
applicable in the United States (Ref. 6:p. 7). By far the most blatant difference between 
foreign flag and American flag ship is the cost of labor. The cost to man a U.S. vessel 
can almost be 20 times that of labor on a foreign ship (Ref. 5:p. 8). Requiring more men 
at a much higher wage rate, companies that operate under the American flag have a very 
difficult time staying in business and producing any profit. 
While the government has created several programs to ensure enough ships are 
available to fulfill the cargo capacities of military surge requirements, a solution to 
increase the mariner pool remains illusive. Concerns over mariner manpower levels have 
moved some organizations to study the issue and begin to track mariners. However, there 
is no single organization that can clearly state the number of mariners available, or the 
existing crewing requirements for the U.S. commercial fleet. The billet requirements of 
the government fleet can be determined, but it would be difficult to guarantee that all the 
ships could be manned if required. Part of the reason it is difficult to ascertain the 
number of available mariners is because they belong to several different unions and work 
for different companies. Unions are under no obligation, nor do they feel compelled to 
provide any mariner information, even to government agencies such as the Maritime 
Administration (MARAD). The primary source that MARAD uses to collect data on 
mariners is the United States Coast Guard, the government agency responsible for 
mariner testing and certification, and issuance of licenses and documents.   However, 
simply tracking licenses and documents does not necessarily mean that these mariners are 
available, qualified, or willing to sail in a contingency. 
B. OBJECTIVE 
The objective of this research is to determine if there is a sufficient number of 
qualified merchant mariners to meet the crewing requirements brought on by a 
contingency without sacrificing manning levels in the commercial fleet. Part of this 
project will also analyze the United States maritime industry to determine the causes of 
the mariner shortage, if one exists. 
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
1. Primary Question 
• Is there a sufficient number of available, willing, and able licensed and 
unlicensed merchant mariners to man the billet surge (surge billets) connected 
with sealift requirements of a national contingency? 
2. Secondary Research Questions 
• Who tracks mariner manpower and why is there uncertainty about mariner 
manpower levels? 
• How many billets exist under normal conditions and how many more would a 
contingency require? 
• Is there a real shortage of mariners? If so, what has caused the shortage? 
• What are the consequences of a mariner shortage during a national 
contingency and what policies and procedures can be considered to increase 
the mariner pool? 
D.       SCOPE, LIMITATIONS, AND ASSUMPTIONS 
This thesis will include a review and brief analysis of current U.S. Maritime 
Policy, and a review of various maritime programs, such as the Maritime Security 
Program, Voluntary Intermodal Sealift Agreement, and the National Defense Reserve 
Fleet/Ready Reserve Fleet. The mariner manpower pools and sources will be identified 
as well as the maritime organizations whose functions depend on mariners. Finally, the 
roles of the U.S. Department of Transportation, United States Maritime Administration, 
U.S. Coast Guard, United States Transportation Command, Military Sealift Command, 
and maritime unions will be reviewed. 
The data, which was collected from multiple sources, varied greatly from source 
to source. Most of the sources gave no references to back up the stated numbers. For the 
sake of this thesis, the numbers in the sources are assumed to be the most accurate 
available. Additionally, this thesis focuses only on American flag commercial vessels, 
United States government-owned vessels, and United States citizen mariners. 
E.   METHODOLOGY 
A simple logic chain is used to determine whether the current maritime industry is 
capable of meeting the national security requirement to support two nearly-simultaneous 
major theater wars. This will be covered futher in Chapter II. 
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F.        ORGANIZATION 
This thesis is organized into eight chapters and nine appendixes. Chapter I serves 
as an introduction to the research issues. 
Chapter II lays out the methodology which was used for this thesis. 
Chapter III explains the major responsible agencies in the United States Maritime 
Industry and their roles in the current trends of the merchant marine. 
Chapter IV explains some of the main maritime policies and programs currently 
in place and their affect on the maritime industry. 
Chapter V analyzes the United States Maritime Industry using a policy analysis 
systems model. 
Chapter VI defines what the National Security Strategy as it relates to sealift, and 
the approximate tonnages required to be moved to meet that strategy, as well as listing 
the various sealift assets the nation can call on. 
Chapter VII converts the required tonnage to ships that would be needed, and 
compares the billets on those ships with the estimated number of merchant mariners in 
the employment pool. 
Chapter VIII gives the findings and recommendations and the conclusion. 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
II.  METHODOLOGY 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter discusses the methodology used for this study. As stated in the 
introduction of this thesis, this research questions if there are enough qualified merchant 
mariners to meet the crewing requirements of a contingency without sacrificing manning 
levels in the commercial fleet. On the surface, this appears as one question, but it really 
involves two issues. On one hand, the number of licensed and unlicensed mariners 
available and qualified to sail must be ascertained. On the other hand, the crewing 
requirements of the various maritime organizations that draw from these mariner pools 
must be assessed. This being the case, this methodology will address the number of 
mariners and the requirements, a seemingly simple logic chain. 
Unfortunately many insurmountable obstacles surfaced while pursuing this logic 
chain. In some cases no data was available, in others the data was not adequate to fulfill 
the purpose of this thesis. This chapter presents the simple logic chain and its 
shortcomings. 
B. THE SIMPLE LOGIC CHAIN 
In formulating an approach to the thesis, it became evident that the research 
would best be served by getting to the very root of the sources that determine 
requirements and the sources that maintain the manpower pools. This required the 
researchers to follow through a series of questions, starting with the effect (current 
situation) and asking about the cause, and repeating the process until reaching the origin 
of the simple logic chain. The basic question asks whether there are enough mariners to 
respond to a national contingency. In addressing the first part of this question, the 
number of mariners can be ascertained by summing the number of union and nonunion 
mariners. This requires data from maritime unions and shipping companies. However, 
simply determining the size of the mariner pool available does not answer the question 
completely, because the requirements must be known. 
The next question that must be addressed is how these requirements are 
determined. It is evident that a national contingency would require a large number of 
mariners. But just how many mariners are needed is determined by the number of ships 
to be mobilized. The number of ships to be mobilized depends on the cargo to be moved. 
In turn, the cargo to be moved depends on the military plans tied to the national strategy. 
Lastly, national strategy depends upon the perceived threat in the global environment. 
The simple logic chain, as applied below, is a basic process that traces the causes 
and effects to eventually determine number of mariners available and manpower 
requirements. 
1.        Cargo Capacity and Ship Requirements Methodology 
Having traced the issue to its roots, this research started with the perceived treat in 
the global environment, which affects national strategy; this strategy requires a surge 
capacity that demands so many ships, which in turn require so many mariners. These 
steps are discussed in the following paragraphs. 
Countries such as Iraq, North Korea, and Iran are but a few countries that give 
rise to perceived threats in the global environment. To determine the position the United 
States has in response to this, it was necessary to review documents such as A National 
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Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement. This document states that the United 
States national strategy calls for its armed forces to be capable of winning two nearly 
simultaneous major theater wars (MTW). 
The next step was to determine how much cargo capacity was required to support 
two nearly simultaneous major theater wars. Inquiries at the Navy's Operational 
Logistics and Strategic Mobility Division (OPNAV N42) and the Maritime 
Administration pointed to the Mobility Requirements Study - 2005 (MRS-05), which is a 
comprehensive review of the military's airlift and sealift capabilities. This study provided 
the estimated number of ships, voyages, and cargo capacity required to support two 
MTWs. It should be noted however, that the cargo capacities provided with the study 
were tied to specific ships, but no explanation was included as to precisely how the total 
cargo capacity requirements to support two MTWs were established, which was also the 
intent of the study. 
Given that the term "major" in two major theater wars refers to a conflict similar 
in magnitude to Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm, additional sealift data from this 
period was collected. This data included the amount and type of cargo that was moved 
and the number and types of ships that supported the war effort. These figures were then 
multiplied by two and compared to the MRS-05 estimates as a validation. 
2. Ship and Cargo Capacity Availability Methodology 
Having assessed the ship and tonnage requirements necessary to meet the national 
security strategy, it became necessary to determine the number of ships and the cargo 
capacity the United States has at its disposal to support its strategy. Data was collected 
for vessels in the following categories: Prepositioned Vessels, Fast Sealift Ships, Ready 
11 
Reserve Fleet, Voluntary Intermodal Sealift Agreement, Maritime Security Program, and 
U.S. flag commercial fleet. Merchant ships from allied and other nations are not included 
in this estimate because there are no guarantees that other nations will support our next 
armed conflict. 
3. Merchant Mariner Requirement Methodology 
With the number and types of ship determined, the next step was to estimate the 
mariners required to man these ships. To this end, it is important to recognize that the 
number of billets is not equal to the required number of sailors. A ratio of 1.5 mariners 
for every billet is used to account for mariners on vacation but still employed on a ship or 
by a union. 
4. Merchant Mariner Availability Methodology 
Labor unions, shipping companies, the U.S. Coast Guard and the Maritime 
Administration (MARAD) were contacted in order to determine the size of the mariner 
pool. Since labor unions control some mariner pools, letters were written and telephone 
calls were made to explain the purpose of this thesis and request information about the 
number of members and the licenses/documents they held. The same information was 
requested from shipping companies. 
Given that the U.S. Coast Guard issues licenses and qualifications, they were 
contacted to obtain information on number and type of licenses or qualifications issued 
per year; number of renewals per year; and number of upgrades per year. 
MARAD was contacted to request information on the number of mariners 
available by category, and the number of ships and their capacities available through the 
various military support programs and in the U.S. commercial fleet.    The National 
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Defense Transportation Association was also contacted for information. However, the 
information obtained from this organization could not be verified so it was not used in 
this thesis. 
C.       DATA SHORTFALLS 
There were several obstacles that limited the scope and effectiveness of this study. 
To begin, the MRS-05 study is a classified document; only the executive summary is 
unclassified. Therefore, access to the document was very limited. For instance, the 
section summarizing how the actual tonnage needed to support two MTWs was not 
available. Although information on the ships required and their cargo capacity was 
available, there was no indication as to how the required tonnage was estimated. 
To compound these data problems, capacity measurements are not consistent. 
The capacities for some vessels are provided in deadweight tons, some in square feet of 
deck space, and others in twenty-foot container equivalent units. This makes it difficult 
to compare vessel capacities. Furthermore, no documents were found that clearly 
delineated the number of mariners that were necessary to operate each type of ship. 
Perhaps the greatest data shortfall involved determining the number of mariners 
available. The labor unions, shipping companies and the U.S. Coast Guard National 
Maritime Center were unable to provide the requested data. While MARAD was very 
cooperative, the data systems it is currently using were not able to provide the data 
necessary for this thesis. 
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III.    MARITIME INDUSTRY RESPONIBLE AGENCIES 
A.       MARITIME UNIONS 
Maritime labor unions arose in reaction to the harsh treatment of many mariners 
by the shipping companies in the nineteenth century. Discipline onboard a ship was 
absolute and the ship's officers had powers similar to naval officers during wartime. 
Once a sailor signed articles binding him to a ship, he was essentially an indentured 
servant to the ship or company. Andrew Furuseth founded the first seaman's union in 
1895, the International Seaman's Union (ISU). By 1915 ISU had enough political and 
moral strength to influence the passage of laws establishing standards for quarters and 
food onboard U.S. Flag ships. The union was also instrumental in promoting the passage 
of the Merchant Marine Act of 1936 (Ref. 2:p. 160). Another union actually had roots 
earlier than the ISU; the Master's Mates and Pilots was founded in 1887 as a professional 
association of harbor pilots, but it did not become a bona fide labor union until after 
World War II. 
The maritime unions gained the same rights as industrial workers under the 
National Labor Relations Act of 1935. This officially allowed them to organize, bargain 
collectively, and strike. The unions emerged as the primary backer for the subsidy 
provisions of the Merchant Marine Act of 1936. From the late 1940's, organized labor 
took the lead and assumed the task of securing government approval for maritime 
industry subsidies, allowing the shipping companies to meet union demands for higher 
salaries. They justified these higher salaries as being covered by the subsidies. This 
began a spiral of events that led to shipping companies essentially becoming the 
intermediaries transferring government subsidies into labor salaries, until the moderate 
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subsidies could cover the high mariner wage costs, but few of the other expenses of 
competing with foreign flag vessels (Ref. 7:p. 115). 
The Second World War might have saved the industry from this inflationary wage 
spiral. The nation's leaders were unsure of how to treat the men and women sailing on 
the ships carrying the military's cargo. Naturally, the unions and merchant seamen were 
concerned about the possible militarization of the merchant marine. They wanted to 
avoid uniforms, saluting, and all the additional paperwork associated with the military. 
In fact, the unions were on strike in the months immediately preceding the attack on Pearl 
Harbor. Seamen were kept in a civilian status and not made a branch of the military. 
Therefore, the War Shipping Administration could not use the draft and instead had to 
use higher wages to entice people to sail. In effect, what could have helped the industry 
only continued to raise the wages (Ref. 7:p. 145). 
A maritime union operates differently from other labor unions, due to the 
industry's nature. Typically a U.S. steamship company has a few ships' officers as 
permanent crew. The rest of the crew comes from the union hiring halls. Unions send 
out sailors and engineers based on their seniority and the time rested from their last 
voyage. Steamship companies have little to no say as to who is hired to sail their ships. 
Seamen may be disciplined for violating union regulations, but not usually by the 
company. This system has its problems, but it is preferable to the shakedowns and 
bribery that ran the process in the early part of the 1900s (Ref. 2:p. 156). 
The unions have done many good things for the American merchant sailor, 
including setting standards for shipboard quality of life and safety. However, they have 
also caused some problems with which the industry is struggling with.    First, the 
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maritime academies and union schools produce approximately 3,770 officers per year, 
but not all of them can or will enter a union. Most of them find maritime related jobs 
ashore and a few join the armed forces. Second, shipping companies are not allowed to 
operate at their maximum efficiency because unions set manning requirements exceeding 
those needed to operate ships efficiently. Third, unions demand high wages for their 
members, relative to other international shipping companies. Crew costs can account for 
as much as 50% of a ship's operating cost (Ref. 2:p. 102). Fourth, the unions' ability to 
picket a ship or ships can quickly create sizable losses for shipping companies. These are 
a few of the reasons that drive U.S. shipping companies to foreign flags of convenience, 
where they are free to hire only the labor they need and at a lower rate. This in turn 
reduces the number of U.S. sailing jobs, forcing unions to limit membership even more. 
Each union has its own membership about which they closely guard all 
information. They balk at providing any type of data to government agencies and even 
then only give the bare minimum. Table 1 compares the employment of mariners on U.S. 
flag vessels with the membership in the major shipboard unions (Ref. 2:p. 159). Table 2 
lists the main labor unions that provide mariners to the U.S. merchant fleet and their 
approximate membership (Ref. 2:p. 162). The misleading thing about the number of 
union members is that this total may include pensioners or retired sailors. This issue will 
be addressed further in Chapter VII. 
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Table 1. 
Year Employment Year Union 
Membership 
1929 63,800 1936 At least 22,500 
1938 49,800 
1945 158,900 
1950 56,600 1948 144,000 
1952 70,700 1953 112,500 
1960 49,200 1963 135,500 
1968 54,200 
1970 37,600 1971 145,000 
1980 19,600 1979 137,000 
1986 11,600 
1992 9,200 1991 119,000 
U.S. Maritime Employment versus Membership in Shipboard Unions from 
1929-1992. 
Union 
Masters, Mates & Pilots 
Marine Engineers 
Beneficiary Association 
National Maritime Union 













































Previously strong unions have been weakened by the steady decline of the U.S. 
fleet. They have felt the sting of the disappearing mariner pool, so much so that many 
unions have waived the initiation fees for new members; these fees can exceed two 
thousand dollars. Despite this situation, the unions are still fragmented. Instead of 
presenting a unified voice for maritime issues, they often lobby separately with little 
result. Truly unified labor could benefit the maritime industry by providing a common 
front and a powerful lobby. 
B.        MILITARY SEALIFT COMMAND 
Within the Department of Defense, sealift is the responsibility of the Military 
Sealift Command (MSC), one of the three components of the United States 
Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM), along with the Air Mobility Command 
(AMC) and the Military Traffic Management Command (MTMC). MSC operates 
approximately 130 vessels through five general programs; Naval Fleet Auxiliary Force 
(NFAF), Special Missions, Prepositioning, Ship Introduction and Sealift. Appendix A 
lists the vessels in the current MSC fleet. 
The NFAF vessels provide underway replenishment for Naval combatant forces. 
Providing fuel, food, ammunition, spare parts and other supplies, Naval Fleet Auxiliary 
Force (NFAF) ships enable the Navy fleet to operate at the highest operational tempo 
possible. Operating thirteen tankers, six combat stores ships, five ocean-going tugs, and 
seven ammunition ships on both coasts of the United States and overseas, MSC is almost 
the sole source for replenishing Naval ships at sea. The two hospital ships, USNS Mercy 
and USNS Comfort, also come under the NFAF fleet.   The impressive cost savings 
resulting from using MSC civilian crews versus Navy personnel continues to grow each 
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year, as the Military Sealift Command assumes more of the Navy's combat logistics role. 
In the next few years, MSC expects that trend to continue, as additional Navy resupply 
ships and missions are transferred to this command (Ref. 8). Most recently, the AOE 
class of regular Navy supply ships has been considered for transfer to the NFAF fleet. 
The Prepositioning Program consists of 33 civilian-manned vessels and is the core 
element of the Navy's force forward strategy. The ships, listed in Chapter IV, are 
preloaded with military supplies to sustain forward deployed Army, Air Force, Navy, and 
Marine units, and are segregated into three divisions. Thirteen vessels constitute the 
Combat Prepositioning Force (CPF) and are deployed in the Arabian Gulf, the Indian 
Ocean, and the western Pacific. Designed to support Army missions, these ships carry 
enough combat material, food, water, and other essentials to sustain two Army heavy 
brigades, including 6,000 soldiers for 30 days. Another thirteen vessels make up the 
Maritime Prepositioning Force (MPF) that support a Marine Corps Air/Ground Task 
Force of up to 51,000 marines. They are prepositioned in the Mediterranean Sea, Indian 
Ocean, and the southwest Pacific. Finally, seven vessels comprise the Logistics 
Prepositioning Force (LPF) that serves Air Force, Navy, and Defense Logistics Agency 
needs. They include three Air Force precision munitions ships, three tankers carrying 
600,000 barrels of oil, and one Navy field hospital (Ref. 9). 
MSC, as the responsible agency for military sealift, gains operational 
responsibility over the Ready Reserve Fleet vessels after the Maritime Administration 
activates them. MSC is the government contractor when it comes to making contracts for 
sealift with commercial and foreign carriers. In addition to the sizable fleet they already 
manage, they have the sole responsibility for all sealift during a contingency. While they 
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are not directly involved with the issues regarding manning the RRF, they reap the end 
benefits or problems that may arise. Despite all of this, MSC has remained relatively 
detached from the industry as a whole. The command has not, and likely will not, take 
the lead in maritime issues, preferring to leave that to the commercial companies and 
unions. 
C.       MARITIME ADMINISTRATION 
The Department of Transportation's Maritime Administration is the government's 
primary agency responsible for the American flag merchant marine. With the exception 
of licensing and shipboard inspections, MARAD is responsible for just about everything 
having to do with the maritime industry. Their mission states that the "overall mission of 
the Maritime Administration (MARAD) is to promote the development and maintenance 
of an adequate, well-balanced, United States merchant marine, sufficient to carry the 
Nation's domestic waterborne commerce and a substantial portion of its waterborne 
foreign commerce, and capable of serving as a naval and military auxiliary in time of war 
or national emergency." (Ref. 10) 
Since MARAD was transferred from the Department of Commerce to the 
Department of Transportation in the 1980's, the more powerful aviation and land 
transportation constituencies have tended to overshadow it. Hence, until recently, 
MARAD had limited ability to influence the size of the merchant marine under U.S. 
registry (Ref. 2:p. 61) As mentioned earlier, the Maritime Security Act of 1996 created 
the Maritime Security Program (MSP) which charges MARAD with promoting a 
privately owned, U.S. registered, and U.S. crewed dry cargo vessel inventory that can 
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fulfill the national security requirements and remain competitive in world commerce 
(Ref. 11 :p. 75). This program will be discussed in Chapter IV. 
MARAD is also charged with ensuring that ports are efficient, shipbuilding and 
repair service are adequate, and intermodal water and land transportation systems are 
effective. They have done this through a program and initiative called the Maritime 
Transportation System (MTS). Extensive reports on the state of the MTS and the work 
being done to improve or preserve it have been published, and research is still ongoing. 
These reports can be found on the MARAD web site at www.marad.dot.gov/publications. 
In order to maintain an educated maritime officer corps, MARAD operates the 
United States Merchant Marine Academy and provides funding assistance to six state 
maritime schools. The state maritime academy cadets can participate in the Student 
Incentive Payment (SIP) Program in which MARAD grants them $3,000 annually to 
offset school costs. In return for this assistance, students are obligated to complete the 
academy's course of instruction, pass the Coast Guard examination for a merchant 
marine officer's license, maintain that license for at least six years, apply for an 
appointment as a commissioned officer in an armed forces reserve component for six 
years, and maintain employment in the maritime industry for at least three years after 
graduation (Ref. 12:p. 70). 
MARAD also monitors the application of the Jones Act provisions, in cooperation 
with the U.S. Customs Service, and the cargo preference laws, both of which will be 
discussed in detail in the following Chapter.    Finally MARAD is tasked with the 
acquisition, maintenance and manning of the National Defence Reserve Fleet, which 
consists of the Ready Reserve Force and the inactive fleet.    As for manning and 
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maintaining the RRF, MARAD must rely on maritime unions to provide the mariners 
who fulfill these tasks. The role this agency plays in the industry is vital due to their 
responsibility for overseeing so many maritime policies and programs. 
D.       MARITIME SCHOOLS 
The United States Merchant Marine Academy and the six state maritime 
academies provide the industry with new officers. Table 3 lists the approximate yearly 
graduates of each of the state schools and the Merchant Marine Academy (Ref. 13). On 
the unlicensed side, several union schools provide the training for the deck hands and 
enginemen, as well as courses to meet the Standards of Training and Watchkeeping 
which will be discussed later. One such school is the Harry Lundeberg School of 
Seamanship at the Paul Hall Center in Piney Point, Maryland operated by the Sailors 
International Union (SIU). As a side note, one of the most reputable engineering schools, 
the National Marine Engineers' Beneficial Association's (MEBA) Calhoon Engineering 
school discontinued their entry level curriculum in 1988 because of the decline in the 
industry and now only run a continuing education program (Ref. 14). 
The level of education provided these mariners is one of the highest in the world. 
Unfortunately, with the decline of the merchant fleet and increasing draw of shore-side 
jobs, many graduates are not sailing after graduation; if they do sail, it is generally for a 
short time until they find a shore-side job. Very little effort is made to enforce the 
commitment to work in a maritime related field after graduation, especially at the U.S. 
Merchant Marine Academy. There are pending initiatives that would require Academy 
graduates to apply for a waiver from MARAD if they choose to work in the shore side 
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industry, in an attempt to force more graduates to go to sea. The other maritime schools 
have limited alumni tracking and are not able to produce statistics as to which of their 
graduates are currently sailing. To compound the issue, the schools producing the 
officers that man our fleet do not often cooperate with each other and, as with the unions, 
do not present a unified voice on maritime issues. 
Qualified Graduates 
Maritime School                                                                           1998                   1999                  2000 






Maine Maritime Academy, Castine ME 176 176 176 
Massachusetts Maritime Academy, Buzzards Bay MA 83 75 75 
California Maritime Academy, Vallejo CA 51 66 61 
State University of New York Maritime College, Throggs Neck NY Not Available Not Available Not Available 
Texas Maritime Academy, Galveston TX 35 25 
Great Lakes Maritime Academy, Traverse City MI 23 26 21 
♦Paul Hall Center (SIU School for Seamen), Piney Point MD 4,000+ 4,000+ 4,000+ 
The Paul Hall Center offers several approved courses for Abled Body Seaman (AB) and Qualified Member of the Engine Department 
(QMED), as well as Third Mate, Third Engineer, Limited tonnage Third Mate and Third Engineer. The Center also provides most of 
the necessary courses to complete the Standards of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping requirements.   Actual number of 
qualified graduates unavailable. 
Table 3. Maritime Schools and Recent Graduates 
E.        UNITED STATES COAST GUARD 
The Coast Guard is the regulatory agency responsible for the safety of all United 
States  vessels.      Subsequently,  they  are  responsible  for  determining   all  training 
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requirements, conducting all qualification testing and licensing for all mariners working 
on American waters. The U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) and the American Bureau of 
Shipping, the main classification society in the U.S. flag fleet, impose high safety 
standards on U.S. shipping companies. These standards are generally more stringent than 
those enforced on flag-of-convenience vessels. The U.S. Coast Guard is also responsible 
for implementing the new international convention on Standards of Training and 
Certification of Watchkeepers (STCW). The Coast Guard will administer the U.S. 
STCW, which far exceeds the minimum requirements of STCW required by the 
international convention and administered by the International Maritime Organization 
(IMO). Additionally, the international convention does not provide a mechanism to 
verify how a given country will administer or comply with STCW (Ref. 2:p. 178). This 
means that some countries may decide to meet only the bare minimum requirements of 
the agreement, while others, like the United States and the Netherlands, may go above 
and beyond the scope of the original STCW agreement. 
As mentioned, the United States Coast Guard is the regulatory agency responsible 
for licensing and documenting all U.S. merchant mariners. As required by applicable 
laws, no one may be employed on a U.S. flag merchant ship of 100 gross tons or over 
without a merchant mariner document issued by one of the USCG Regional Examination 
Centers (Ref. 15). 
While it serves a vital regulatory role in the maritime industry, the Coast Guard is 
not the industry's voice. The Coast Guard has many other duties, including law 
enforcement, safety inspections, and coastal defense. In actuality, the licensing 
department is a small part of the service and there is not enough interest, manpower or 
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reason for them to take a more active part in supporting the maritime industry. They 
support MARAD and have helped them with license data downloads to assist in 
determining the number of qualified mariners in the industry, but they have not taken an 
active role in lobbying for the maritime industry due to their many other responsibilities. 
F.        SHIPYARDS 
As ships from the WWII surplus flooded the world ship market, and U.S. 
companies opted for flags of convenience, U.S. shipyards dwindled considerably in 
number and production of new vessels in the post-war period. As of 1999, there were 19 
private shipbuilding and repair shipyards in the U.S., but only two were involved in 
constructing large oceangoing commercial vessels. Although more than 200 privately 
owned firms repair ships in the U.S., only 73 of these are capable of handling large 
vessels; of these, only 33 have dry docking facilities (Ref. 16:p. xiv). Not only have our 
shipyards declined in number, they have lost much or their skilled labor and expertise. 
Were the nation forced to undergo a mass shipbuilding effort, such as occurred in 
World War II, it is unlikely that sufficient personnel could be found with the knowledge 
to mass produce vessels. The industry's thirty-year concentration on naval construction 
has diminished its commercial shipbuilding ability and posed a major challenge for 
reentering the international shipbuilding arena. While the quality of American-built 
vessels is among the highest in the world, there simply are not enough U.S. ships built to 
impact the industry. This situation, coupled with the high cost of unionized labor, makes 
shipbuilding in the U.S. much more expensive than overseas shipyards. According to the 
Department of Labor, the shipbuilding and repair industry employed 72,800 production 
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workers in mid-1998. Since the naval build up of the 1980s, 75,500 production jobs have 
been lost, a more than 50 percent decline (Ref. 17:p. 2). As a result, the shipyard lobby, 
while vocal and moderately organized, is too small to influence maritime reform. 
G.       MARITIME COMPANIES 
There are approximately 40 different U.S. shipping companies operating 
America's deep-water fleet. There are also many smaller companies that own and 
operate the tugs, barges, and inland waterway vessels. These are a vital part of the 
industry. The ocean-going U.S. companies must choose between the restrictions posed 
by the U.S. policies and regulations described in this thesis or seek the benefits of a flag 
of convenience. Under a flag of convenience, shipping companies may not have to 
contend with deeply entrenched unions because they can hire freely with fewer 
restrictions and at lower wages. They may not have to contend with corporate and 
individual taxes or high insurance rates. In many cases, the only U.S. corporate or 
income taxes paid by foreign flag owners are taxes paid on their U.S. shore-based 
facilities and personnel, which are often non-existent. However, vessels operating under 
the U.S. flag are subject to all the taxes and regulatory laws applicable in the United 
States (Ref. 6:p. 7). The cost of acquiring and maintaining a ship for non-U.S. shipping 
companies is much lower at the shipyards of their choice. Safety requirements are still 
extensive, but not nearly as stringent. Hence, there are many areas where ships under 
flags of convenience can capitalize to improve their competitive edge and increase 
revenues. 
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The lawmakers and military planners are well aware of this issue and have taken 
steps to preserve a U.S. flag merchant fleet. Their latest efforts come in the form of the 
Maritime Security Act of 1996, which is discussed in the next chapter. Regardless, the 
maritime companies are key players in any further maritime reform. 
H.       MERCHANT MARINERS 
The last group of concern, and one of the most important, is the merchant 
mariners who sail the ships in question. For the most part, highly educated and 
extensively qualified, United States sailors are some of the best in the world. 
Unfortunately, the glory days of being a merchant sailor are gone. The merchant mariner 
situation will be discussed further in Chapter VII. 
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IV.    MARITIME POLICIES AND PROGRAMS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
With higher costs and cheaper foreign competition, why would any company still 
operate an American flagged vessel? Why does the fleet still exist under these 
conditions? Essentially, the only explanation is the government programs and laws that 
have been created to help sustain the industry. 
B. PREVIOUS MARITIME POLICIES AND PROGRAMS 
Maritime Policy has been a difficult issue for the government since the first 
Congress in 1789. Arguments abounded in the first Continental Congress about what to 
do with the hundreds of privateers flying the new American flag. But the heyday of 
modern policy began with the Merchant Marine Act of 1936. Prior to the Second World 
War, the government recognized the need to maintain a national flag fleet to avoid 
problems with sealift capabilities that occurred during World War I. With the increase in 
foreign competition, government assistance was necessary. The 1936 Act initiated 
several programs and policies to help defray the rising cost of flying the American flag. 
One of the policies defined in the bill, cabotage, is still in effect and will be 
discussed later. Two sets of subsidy programs were also created: the Operational 
Differential Subsidy (ODS), and the Construction Differential Subsidy (CDS). The 
former program provided government money to American companies to defray the 
higher cost of operating a U.S. flag vessel while the latter compensated owners for ship 
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construction in costly American shipyards. The Act also began the Maritime Guaranteed 
Loan (Title XI) Program that helps the shipbuilding and repair industry obtain loans. 
For nearly sixty years, the ODS program sought to equalize the disparity in 
operating costs between American-flag ships and foreign competitors, with respect to 
wages, insurance, maintenance and any repairs which were not compensated by 
insurance. As the years have gone on, studies have shown that despite subsidy payments 
totaling almost $14 billion (Ref: 12:p. 92), both CDS and ODS have failed to 
substantially halt the decline of the merchant fleet. Appendix B lists the subsidy amounts 
paid to maritime companies and shipyards, from the program's inception in 1936 to 1999. 
Despite the large subsidies, which varied from under a million dollars to almost four 
million dollars for a single ship, there was no real incentive for a company to maintain its 
fleet under the American flag. Seen as more failed maritime policy, lawmakers were 
actively searching for ways to stop this apparently futile outflow of cash. 
CDS was the first of these two subsidies to get slashed during the budget-cutting 
era of the early 1980s. President Reagan eliminated the CDS in 1981. The Maritime 
Security Program, a new program that will be discussed later, was created in part to 
eventually replace ODS. No new ODS contracts have been approved since 1981. 
However, it is still an active program with fiscal year 1998 subsidies equaling 
approximately 137.7 million dollars. The last ODS subsidy will expire in October of 
2001 (Ref. 18:p. 10). As a side note, the law required that every vessel receiving an ODS 
must be enrolled in the Sealift Readiness Program (SRP). The SRP is the precursor to the 
Voluntary Intermodal Sealift Agreement and will be discussed in chapter six (Ref. 19:p. 
15) 
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Neither the ODS or the CDS subsidies provided an incentive for the companies to 
maintain their vessels under the U.S. flag. Both of the subsidies merely defrayed the 
additional costs of maintaining registry in the United States. Companies not involved in 
coastwise trade subject to the laws of cabotage, had little reason to struggle making ends 
meet, even with the subsidies, when they could cut their costs tremendously by going 
foreign flagged. 
C.       MARITIME SECURITY PROGRAM AND VOLUNTARY INTERMODAL 
SEALIFT AGREEMENT 
The latest government attempt to actually provide an incentive to save the 
merchant fleet comes through the Maritime Security Act of 1996. This relatively new 
legislation is a ten-year program designed to ensure the existence of military sealift 
capabilities in case of a conflict. Military leaders discovered the hard way in Operations 
Desert Shield/Desert Storm how important sealift capability was to overall military 
readiness. The sheer volume of cargo that was required to be moved by sealift reinforced 
the value of the merchant marine industry in all of the military leadership's minds. 
VADM Francis Donovan, a former Commander, Military Sealift Command stated "From 
a sustainability viewpoint, we need both a capable Ready Reserve Force and a strong, 
active merchant marine; the former to provide the surge movement of equipment and the 
latter to move the follow-on sustaining cargo and supplies.... This capability could be 
jeopardized if the U.S.-flag fleet continues to decline." (Ref. 20) 
With the decline of the American flag merchant marine, the capacity available to 
transport military forces and meet the military's sealift requirements dramatically 
declined.   In an effort to stop this trend, several programs were created, including the 
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Voluntary Intermodal Sealift Agreement (VISA) under the aegis of the Maritime Security 
Program (MSP). Without the MSP, American President Lines and Sea-Land, America's 
two largest commercial carriers, would have been forced to refiag a number of their ships 
to foreign countries. These two companies represent 85 percent of the deep-sea ship 
capacity in the U.S. Merchant Marine (Ref. 21). 
VISA was created after passing the Maritime Security Act of 1996, and modeled 
after USTRANSCOM component Air Mobility Command's Civil Reserve Air Fleet 
(CRAF) program.   As with CRAF, ships that enroll in VISA obtain preference for 
peacetime government cargoes before other U.S.-flag companies. In return for this, they 
are required to donate a certain percentage of their capacity to the Department of Defense 
in time of crisis. There are varying stages of VISA, with Stage III being at least 50% of 
the capacity.  VISA is only activated after the supply of U.S. government owned ships, 
such as the Military Sealift Command and Maritime Prepositioning Ships, have been 
exhausted and after U.S. and foreign flag shipping firms have reached their limit for 
voluntary contracting (Ref. 21).    If the VISA program is activated, the carriers are 
compensated at a fair market rate for the government cargo they transport. Since VISA is 
capacity orientated, shipping companies can combine military cargos with other trade, as 
well as use agreements with other shipping firms. Even if those other firms are foreign 
flag or not VISA participants, the agreements can be used to meet VISA commitments. 
Table 4 below lists the current VISA program participants (Ref. 23). 
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Alaska Cargo Transport Inc.      Donjon Marine Co.. Inc.* 
American Automar. Inc. Double Eagle Marine, Inc. 
American President Lines, 
Ltd. 
E-Ships, Inc. 
Matson Navigation Company, 
Inc. 
Maybank Navigation Company, 
LLC 
McAllister Towing and 
Transportation Co, Inc. 




American Roll-On Roll-Off Farrell Lines Incorporated Moby Marine Corporation Stea Corporation* 
Carrier, LLC 
American Ship Management, First American Bulk Carrier Moran Towing Corporation* Stevens Towing Co., Inc. 
LLCt Corp. t 
Automar International Car First Ocean Bulk Carrier-I, NPR, Inc. Superior Marine Services, 
Carrier, Inc. t LLCt Inc. 
Beyel Brothers Inc. First Ocean Bulk Carrier-II, Ocean Marine Shipping, Inc.* Totem Ocean Trailer 
LLCt Express, Inc. 
Central Gulf Lines, Inc. t First Ocean Bulk Carrier-Ill, 
LLCt 
Odyssea Shipping Line LLC* Trailer Bridge, Inc. 
Columbia Coastal Transport, Foss Maritime Company Osprey Shipholding Corporation, TransAtlantic Lines, LLC 
LLC* LLC 
Cook Inlet Marine Gimrock Maritime, Inc. Resolve Towing & Salvage, Inc. Trico Marine Operators, 
Inc 
Crowley American Transport, Liberty Shipping Group Samson Tug & Barge Company, Troika International, Ltd. 
Inc. Limited Partnership Inc. 
Crowley Marine Services, Lockwood Brothers* Sea Star Line, LLC* U.S. Ship Management, 
Inc. Inc. t 
CSX Lines, LLC Lykes Line Limited, LLC Seacor Marine International Inc. Van Ommeren Shipping 
(USA) LLC 
Dixie Fuels II, Limited Lynden Incorporated Sealift Inc. Waterman Steamship 
Maersk Line, Limitedt SeaTac Marine Services* 
Corporationt 
Weeks Marine, Inc. * Indicates newly approved 
t Indicates MSP Participant 
Table 4. VISA Participants as of 2001 
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VISA is activated at the request of the Commander in Chief, United States 
Transportation Command (USCINCTRANS), with the approval of the Secretary of 
Defense.  Stage I is activated in whole or in part when voluntary capacity is determined 
to be insufficient to meet contingency sealift requirements. Stage II is activated, in whole 
or in part, when the sealift requirements exceed the capability of Stage I (15 percent of 
participant capacity). Stage III is activated when both Stage I and Stage II (40 percent of 
the participant capacity) are insufficient to meet the contingency sealift requirements. 
Stage III activation requires 50 percent of the participant vessel's capacity, except for 
those vessels enrolled in the Maritime Security Program. (Ref. 23.-p. 27)   Appendix C 
gives a graphical representation of this process (Ref. 24). 
In order for a vessel to qualify for the Maritime Security Program, the ship must 
enroll in VISA for 100% of their capacity. In other words, should Stage III of VISA be 
activated, the entire vessel's capacity must be available to the Department of Defense. 
The specific ship itself is not required to cease operations and return to port to load 
military cargo, rather the company that operates it must make an equivalent amount of 
cargo space available to the military, even if it is on a foreign flag vessel. In return for 
this commitment, all MSP vessels are given a subsidy of $2.1 million per vessel per year 
for ten years. The Program supports up to 47 vessels; currently there are 47 ships 
enrolled from ten different companies. Table 5 lists the current vessels enrolled in the 
program and their cargo capacity (Ref. 25). 
Contract No. f'vV'S (Vessel Name Company Gross Tonnage Deadweight 
^Tonnage 
Cargo Capacity Start-Up Date 
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Compared to the previous ODS, the MSP subsidy is less than half the cost. This 
was done as an incentive for companies to increase efficiency and reduce costs. 
Essentially, the ODS contracts as of FY1995 supported 59 American-flag ocean going 
liners at a cost of $216 million.   Comparatively, the MSP contracts support 47 vessels 
with a maximum cost of $100 million a year. Additionally, ODS contracts required ships 
to operate on specific shipping routes, not allowing the company to shift ships to adjust to 
the market. The MPS subsidies do not have these restrictions and give the shipping firms 
additional flexibility to maximize their resources.  With the exception of the remaining 
ODS contracts, the MSP is the only remaining government subsidy given specifically to 
maintain the maritime fleet. One point of concern with the program, however, is that the 
funds to pay the subsidy must be approved every year and there is no guarantee that all or 
any substantial portion of the authorized sum will actually be spent as intended in the act 
(Ref. 26). 
D.       CARGO PREFERENCE LAWS 
One of the most obvious methods to maintain a fleet of American flag vessels is 
to guarantee a level of business through the government. This is done through a series of 
Cargo Preference Laws. The Maritime Administration (MARAD) defines Cargo 
Preference as "the reservation, by law, for transportation on U.S. flag vessels, of all or a 
portion of all ocean borne cargo which moves in international trade either as a direct 
result of the Federal Government's involvement or indirectly because of the financial 
sponsorship of a Federal program or guarantee provided by the government." (Ref. 27) 
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In other words, the government insures a certain amount of business for U.S. flag vessels. 
Guaranteeing business also guarantees profit. 
This policy officially began with the Cargo Preference Act of 1904, which 
required that all items procured for or owned by the U.S. military departments and 
defense agencies be carried exclusively on U.S. flagged vessels. Subsequently, the Cargo 
Preference Act of 1954 required at least 50 percent of the gross tonnage of all 
Government-generated cargo be transported on private U.S. flag vessels, to the extent 
such vessels are available at fair and reasonable rates. The latest change to these laws 
came in 1985 with an amendment to the Merchant Marine Act of 1936, which increased 
the percentage of certain agricultural goods carried on U.S. carriers from 50 to 75 percent 
(Ref. 5:p. 12). 
Even though Cargo Preference laws add an estimated 51 percent to the cost of 
transporting government goods, or approximately $578 million above the lowest cost 
carrier between 1989 and 1993 (Ref. 5:p. 20), its value to the merchant fleet is somewhat 
difficult to dispute. Even though the exact numbers vary according to the source, these 
preference laws can be credited with spending over $3.5 billion between FY89 and FY93 
shipping goods on American flag carriers. Policy opponents cite the additional cost as 
being unnecessary and wasteful. While cargo preference laws have not significantly 
affected the fleet's share of international freight, data suggests that an estimated two- 
thirds of the fleet would re-flag or cease operating if these laws were to be repealed. The 
General Accounting Office (GAO) November 1994 report, Cargo Preference Laws- 
Estimated Cost and Effects, contains impressive figures. GAO estimated that without 
cargo preference laws, the U.S. flag fleet would lose 81 percent of all general cargo 
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vessels, 90-96 percent of all bulk carriers, 38-45 percent of all tankers, and 77-86 percent 
of the high value intermodal vessels. With all these re-flaggings, approximately 71 
percent of all maritime sailing jobs would disappear (Ref. 28:p. 25-32). The effects of 
that on the military's sealift capability would be absolutely devastating. 
E.       JONES ACT AND CABOTAGE 
The last major policy is cabotage.   Originating from the French word "to sail 
along the coast," cabotage requires that all cargo being transported from one domestic 
port to another must be carried on an American flagged vessel. This is by far the oldest 
maritime policy. Cabotage has been common law and practiced since the First Congress 
inl789, when registration was restricted for coastal trades and fisheries to U.S.-built and 
U.S.-owned vessels, and these vessels received preferential treatment with respect to 
tonnage taxes and cargo import duties (Ref. 28). Over forty other nations have cabotage 
laws including Japan, Canada, Germany, Greece, Italy, and Spain. Cabotage became an 
official law with the 1920 Merchant Marine Act, which stated that cargo transported 
entirely or partly by water between U.S. ports must travel in U.S. built, U.S. citizen 
owned vessels that are documented by the U.S. Coast Guard for such traffic. Commonly 
recognized as the Jones Act after its sponsor, Senator Wesley Jones of the Commerce 
Committee, the law has been widely regarded as one of the most important, and 
controversial, maritime policies (Ref. 29:p. 21). 
Cabotage is a requirement to operate on certain shipping routes. The value of the 
Jones Act fleet and the routes they serve is impressive. In 1998, over 8 million 
passengers and 1 billion tons of cargo, valued at $222 billion, were transported over 
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routes subject to the Jones Act (Ref. 30:p. 38). These trade routes are essentially 
guaranteed, with no foreign competition allowed. Even with the guarantee of business, 
shipping firms must find ways to increase efficiencies and cut costs to compete with the 
other Jones Act vessels. Additionally, Jones Act vessels are not eligible to receive ODS 
or Maritime Security Program subsidies. Nevertheless, over 75 percent of the Jones Act 
fleet is militarily useful and represents 30 percent of all VISA capacity (Ref. 31). 
Without the Jones Act, undoubtedly much of the current U.S. flag fleet would quickly go 
out of business or reflag due to cheaper foreign competition. Table 6 lists the number 





Gross Kegistelpl      DeadwelpifTömit^e? 
Tonnage- 
4286 7625 
Dry Bulk Carrier 55 89 
Full Container 25 548 598 
Roll-On/Roll-Off 13 377 239 
Cruise/Passenger 20 
Freighter 32 45 
Total 153 5318 8603 
Table 6. Privately-owned     self-propelled     Merchant     Vessels     with 
Unrestricted Domestric Trading Privileges (Jones Act) Vessels of 1,000 GRT and above 
as of July 1,2000 (Tonnage in Thousands) 
F.   POLICY AND PROGRAM CONTROVERSY 
As with all U.S. Government programs and policies, the country's maritime 
policy has its supporters and opponents.   The pros and cons of each and every policy 
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causes debate across the country.  This makes any attempt at Maritime Policy reform a 
difficult to nearly impossible political task.    Farmers are some of the most vocal 
opponents of current policy, specifically the Jones Act and cargo preference. They argue 
that these laws force them to pay a higher price for transporting their goods and therefore 
prohibit them from competing on a global level. The American Farm Bureau Federation 
is one of the largest anti-cabotage and anti-cargo preference lobbies.   They view these 
policies as "prime examples of intrusive government regulation of an industry that should 
be allowed to function according to market forces and has failed to compete because the 
government has provided a monopoly that shelters it from market competition."(Ref. 33) 
While this position can be challenged, it is representative of the controversial nature of 
maritime policy. Even the MSP has its opponents. Specifically, opponents point out that 
many of the MSP vessels may be registered in the United States, but they are actually run 
by foreign companies through an American subsidiary.  Does this matter? Some people 
feel that the U.S. government is essentially subsidizing a foreign company. The debates 
on these policies are complex, controversial, and could each fill their own thesis. 
These policies have become very controversial subjects, with many claiming that 
they do more harm than good. So the bottom line seems to be what can be done to 
maintain our American-flag merchant fleet? Do the current policies provide enough 
incentives to the shipping companies? The current trends show the number of ships in 
the fleet leveling out, even as the tonnage capacity increases. So the policies have 
apparently been able to marginally stem, or slow down, the industry's demise. Any 
future policies, however, will have a very difficult time passing Congress. It is unlikely 
that the American-flag fleet will ever be as strong as it was after World War II, but as 
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long as cargo preference guarantees cargo, the Jones Act guarantees routes for U.S. 
registered ships only, and programs such as VISA and MSP provide an option and 
incentive for maritime companies to maintain American-flagged vessels, our merchant 
marine will limp along. The Maritime Security Act of 1996 was a good step toward 
future policy, linking the fleet to national security needs. 
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V.      ANALYZING THE UNITED STATES MARITIME 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The object of this research is to determine whether or not there are enough 
merchant mariners to respond to a national contingency. However, this thesis would be 
of little value without at least identifying and analyzing the factors that made the 
condition of the U.S. maritime industry an issue of concern. To this end, the systems 
model was effective in laying out the myriad of elements that make up this complex topic 
in a more tangible and manageable context. The next paragraph briefly describes the 
systems model. This is followed by applying the systems model to the U.S. maritime 
industry, which shows that the greatest problem is perhaps in the input block of the 
systems model, specifically in the critical element of direction setting policy. With 
policy identified as a major source of the problem, the chapter proceeds with the process 
of policy analysis. 
B. THE SYSTEMS MODEL 
The systems model used in this chapter is a cause and effect model that can be 
traced to the Model for Analyzing Work Groups developed by Michael B. McCaskey 
(Ref. 34). Dr. Nancy C. Roberts evolved McCaskey's model into the Organizational 
Systems Framework.1 The latter makes it possible to take very complex organizations 
and break them down into three basic internal elements: inputs, throughputs and results. 
1
 Dr. Nancy C. Roberts is a Professor at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, CA. She uses 
the Organizational Systems Framework as part of an Organization and Management Course but has not 
published a work that includes this model. 
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Inputs are factors that provide system direction. Throughput includes design factors 
composed of tasks, technologies, structure, people and processes/subsystems. Results 
consist of culture, outputs and outcomes. Finally, the internal system itself is responsive 
to the external environmental context. With all the elements and factors plotted in the 
model, it is possible to trace how inputs and throughput affect the results. It is important 
to recognize that although changes can be applied directly to the inputs and throughput 
elements, the culture, outputs or outcomes in the results element cannot be changed 
directly. To effect changes in the result element, it is necessary to make them indirectly 
via the inputs and throughputs. For a graphic representation of this model see Appendix 
D. It is also important to note that the systems model in this case is not used to analyze 
one organization. Instead, the model is modified slightly to analyze multiple 
organizations as they impact the U.S. maritime industry. 
C.       THE MARITIME INDUSTRY IN THE SYSTEMS MODEL 
As one dives into the maritime field, it is relatively easy to drown in the 
magnitude and complexity of the challenges that affect the U.S. Merchant Marine. 
However, the underlying questions about the causes for its decline are helpful in that they 
point to a cause and effect problem. Hence, in laying out and tracing the maritime 
dilemma, a systems approach is appropriate because of its "cause and effect property." 
Appendix E is a basic layout of the systems model applied to the maritime industry, 
showing the environment/context, the inputs, throughput or design factors, and results in 
terms of culture, outputs and outcomes. The following paragraphs examine these 
elements and factors with more detail. 
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1. Environment/Context 
The environment with which the U.S. Merchant Marine must contend is 
determined by political, economic, and social/cultural forces. In the political arena, the 
President of the United States formulates National Security Strategy in response to 
perceived threats. Congress makes laws in response to the President's strategy, interest 
groups such as unions, and others such as environmental groups. The state of the 
economy has effects on trade and manpower while the social/cultural settings of the 
general public determine the level of support and commitment to the maritime industry. 
Although these are external to the system, they play a major role in influencing inputs, 
throughput and therefore results. 
2. Key Success Factors 
Historically, the rise and fall of maritime nations has always been correlated with 
commercial and military command of the sea. These maritime nations were committed to 
sea power at the highest levels of their political system. A strong military is necessary to 
enforce foreign policy and protect national interests anywhere on the globe. An efficient 
and effective maritime industry is essential if America is to secure its fair share of world 
trade and ensure its capability to respond to surge requirements in the event of a national 
emergency. Efficiency and effectiveness can only be achieved through collaboration of 
all the stakeholders in the system. 
3. System Direction 
Direction refers to policy as delineated by visions, missions, goals, strategies, 
laws and regulations derived from the President, Congress and other organizations.  In 
the context of this thesis, it is necessary to start with the President's National Security 
Strategy, which states: 
45 
Taking account of the realities of the post-Cold War era and the new 
threats, a military capability appropriately sized and postured to meet the 
diverse needs of our strategy, including the ability, in concert with 
regional allies, to win two nearly simultaneous major regional conflicts. 
(Ref. 35:p. 29) 
This military capability depends heavily on maritime assets for projecting and 
sustaining forward deployed forces, but this national strategy does not mandate policies 
that ensure a merchant marine capable of supporting military requirements. Documents 
such as the military's Joint Vision 2010/2020 also emphasize military capability and 
readiness, but do not directly address the maritime industry. Legislation as early as the 
Merchant Marine Act of 1920 and as recent as the Maritime Security Act of 1996 is 
specific about promoting a merchant marine that can fulfill national security requirements 
and remain competitive in world commerce. Nevertheless, the present condition of the 
maritime industry suggests that these policies have not been effective. 
4. Throughput - Design Factors 
As mentioned before, the systems model is normally used to analyze one 
organization. In such a model, the design factors are all working together to fulfill a 
common vision and mission. In this case, however, the design factors are components 
from many organizations that are not necessarily working in the same coordinated 
direction. The following paragraphs touch briefly on these design factors, which are 
discussed in greater detail during the analysis. 
The "People" category includes personnel who perform maritime related "Tasks" 
in the private or government sectors.  Merchant mariners are depended upon to man the 
merchant fleet and respond to contingency surge requirements.   Other people and their 
tasks include:    shipping companies own the ships and run the shipping business; 
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shipyards build and repair ships; unions control jobs and manpower, and exercise 
collective bargaining with shipping companies; the U.S. Coast Guard enforces maritime 
safety standards and regulations; Congress makes maritime policy; DoD establishes 
sealift requirements for national security strategy; MARAD is charged with maintaining 
a strong merchant marine. There are many other organizations associated with the 
maritime industry, but only those with the greatest impact in the systems framework are 
mentioned here. 
With so many organizations making up the mechanics of this system, the resulting 
business "Process" is one that can be bureaucratic, political, uncooperative, and 
competitive. While each organization attempts to reach its internal goals, the overall 
"Structure" can be said to be disjointed and complex in the overall framework, which 
should be heading in a direction that promotes a strong maritime that can fulfill national 
strategy. 
The lower costs of operating under a foreign flag of convenience make it difficult 
for U.S. shipping companies to stay competitive. This contributed to the decline in the 
size of the U.S. maritime industry as ship owners opted for open registry countries (Ref. 
l:p. 25). "With reduced activity, U.S. yards lost their economies of scale and became 
less up to date" (Ref. 2:p. 61). Hence, there is little incentive to invest in research and 
development. Thus, the U.S. maritime industry is not making significant progress in the 
area of "Technology." Therefore, it can not leverage innovation to improve its 
competitive edge. 
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5.        Results 
While much has been said to express concern for the U.S. maritime industry, it 
seems that the "Culture" is apathetic. Although instability in global politics can involve 
the U.S. in two nearly simultaneous major theater wars, there seems to be no real sense of 
urgency towards seriously tackling maritime concerns that are crucial to the nation's 
ability to handle these wars. Thus, the "Output" of this entire system appears to be a 
declining maritime capability and uncertainty about mariner availability. The "Outcome" 
then is uncertainty about the U.S. Merchant Marine's ability to fulfill surge requirements 
and sustain forward-deployed forces during a contingency. 
Stepping back to view the overall systems model, it is evident that change in the 
results is necessary. However, the results cannot be changed directly. This leaves input 
and throughput as areas where changes can be applied to effect changes in the results. 
The throughput is too intricate and includes so many organizations that applying change 
to one would necessitate well-coordinated changes in all for a successful result. This 
being the case, change in the input element is necessary to realign the design factors in 
the throughput and thus, lead them in the same direction. In returning to the input 
element, it becomes evident that policy has not managed to stop the decline of the U.S. 
Merchant Marine. This calls for a closer look at maritime policy. The details of the 
flaws in maritime policy are best explained in the process of policy analysis below. 
D.       THE PROCESS OF POLICY ANALYSIS 
As the systems model revealed, a close examination and analysis of maritime 
policy may provide the true source of the issues that endanger the U.S. maritime industry 
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and identify some alternatives to deal with these problems. The five stages of "The 
Process of Analysis" from E.S. Quade's "Analysis for Public Decisions" (Ref 36) are 
used here because their properties lend themselves to look at the problem as a whole. 
These five stages are as follows: 
1. Formulation is helpful in clarifying and determining the objective 
2. Search facilitates identification, designing and screening of alternatives 
3. Forecasting takes into account the predicted future environment 
4. Modeling assists in determining impacts 
5. Synthesis provides for comparing and ranking alternatives (Ref. 36:p. 49) 
The following paragraphs cover these five steps through the process of policy 
analysis. 
1. Formulation - Clarifying the Problem and Determining the Objective 
On the surface, the problem of the decline in the U.S. Merchant Marine could 
easily be identified as a shortage of ships and mariners, but several issues must be 
addressed to legitimize and clarify the problem. First, why is this shortage an important 
issue? 
The United States is committed to protecting its interests and those of its allies. 
This commitment calls for a military capability that depends heavily on sealift to project 
its power anywhere in the world. Hence, this military capability must draw from the 
nation's maritime assets to transport the troops and military cargo necessary during a 
national crisis. In turn, maritime assets are composed of Navy assets as well as civilian 
ships and mariners. The Pentagon's Four Pillars of Military Capability include: 
• Force Structure: the number, size and composition of military units. 
• Modernization: the technical sophistication of the forces, weapon 
systems, and equipment. 
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Sustainability: the "staying power" of the forces measured in days. 
Readiness: the immediate ability to execute a designated combat mission. 
(Ref. 37:p. 3) 
Readiness and sustainability may be at stake because the military's immediate 
ability to execute a designated combat mission, and its staying power, may be hindered if 
there are not enough ships or crews to transport the military cargo necessary to support 
military operations. 
Next, it is essential to look beyond the obvious to identify the causes of the 
problem at hand. The discussion below does not dwell on the details of how each 
organization conducts its business, as this was covered in Chapter III. Rather, its focus is 
on how these organizations influence and respond to policy, and how the overall process 
of interacting with each other and the external environment affects them. 
a.        Labor Unions and Merchant Mariners 
Unions are organized with the intent of protecting mariners from unfair 
business practices. And while the power of collective bargaining is essential to negotiate 
fair wages, ensure job security, and maintain safe working conditions, the nature of the 
maritime industry may cause unions to take self-defeating actions. 
The context within which maritime industrial relations occurs has been 
most influenced by two things. The first is the operation of the national 
maritime policy. One of its effects has been a chronically declining 
shipping industry after each war-induced expansion. The other is the 
operation of union hiring halls. Together they have encouraged the 
development of the labor unions to which control of seagoing jobs are 
critical. (Ref. 38:p. 103) 
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The unions establish contracts on jobs with the shipping companies. 
Union members share these jobs through a rotation system. But as the ratio of mariners 
to jobs increases, the time each mariner can sail is decreased. And as the employment 
opportunity decreases, so does job satisfaction. Thus mariners judge the performance of 
their unions primarily on their ability to control jobs. While unions do not compete for 
members, the competition over jobs has made them long-standing rivals (Ref. 38: p. 104). 
Furthermore, the need to maintain a certain mariner for job ration causes 
unions to limit membership, which has other implications. First, the maritime academies 
and union schools produce approximately 3,770 officers per year, but because of the need 
to protect about 9,300 ocean-going jobs for approximately 21,000 mariners competing for 
these jobs (Ref. 39:p. 105), only a few may enter the union. Most of them must find 
other maritime related jobs ashore. 
The following is an example of how union efforts to support protection of 
coastal shipping under the Merchant Marine Act of 1920 (Jones Act) also had a negative 
impact. In 1980s, U.S. Northwest lumber producers were shipping little to no lumber by 
water because they were unable to compete with Canadian lumber producers who could 
ship their product to U.S. ports at much lower international freight rates. When the 
Northwest lumber producers lobbied Congress for a waiver of the Jones Act, U.S. 
Southeast lumber producers, U.S. flag shipping companies and labor unions were able to 
sway Congress not to act. "One estimate has put the U.S. welfare loss due to Jones Act 
restrictions on these lumber shipments at $12 - 13 million per year" (Ref. 40:p. 79). It is 
likely that other industries suffer in the same manner. 
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Shipping companies may not be allowed to operate at their maximum 
efficiency because unions set manning requirements that are higher than needed to 
operate ships efficiently. Since working at sea involves a certain amount of risk and high 
skills, labor unions also bargain for wages that will compensate crewmembers for the risk 
they take and their skills. However, crew costs (pay, benefits, litigation costs, etc.) may 
account for as much as 50 percent of a ship's operating cost (Ref. 2:p. 102). The largest 
U.S. to foreign operating differential involves total crew costs (Ref. 29:p. 24). 
Labor unions' ability to picket a ship or ships can quickly result in sizable 
losses to shipping companies. "In fact, new high-cost, highly productive ships are 
especially vulnerable to the disruptions caused by work stoppages. As capital-intensity 
increases, each striking seaman idles that much more capital" (Ref. 38:p. 131). While the 
actions of the unions are rational in that they take the necessary action to protect the 
member's interests, these actions may have negative consequences on the shipping 
companies. 
The combined impact of the above contribute to the forces that drive U.S. 
shipping companies to foreign flags of convenience, where they are free to hire only the 
sailors they need to operate efficiently and pay at a much lower wage rate. This in turn 
reduces the number of sailing jobs, forcing unions to limit membership even more. 
b. Congress 
According to one source, the policies that United States has pursued with 
respect to the shipping industry have had a several objectives: 
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Maintaining a defense capability and the role of the U.S. Merchant Marine 
in future military actions; 
Maintaining a viable shipbuilding industry (again, because of defense 
concerns); 
Promoting U.S. trade generally; 
Avoiding monopolization of the shipping industry by foreign carriers; 
Offsetting other governments' subsidies to foreign carriers; 
Offsetting the low wages paid by foreign carriers; 
Improving the U.S. balance of payments; and 
Contributing to U.S. economic growth and job creation. (Ref. 40:p. 29) 
However, even with these goals, it appears that the Congress of the United 
States has been unable to make policy that is conducive to a prosperous merchant marine. 
In 1985, the National Advisory Committee on Oceans and Atmosphere stated in a special 
report to the President and the Congress: "The 'system' of laws and Federal programs 
related to marine transportation is not working" (Ref. 41 :p. 67). In 1998, a former 
Maritime Administrator and Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Maritime Affairs stated 
that "much of the United States' maritime policy is at odds with that of other developed 
nations" (Ref. 42:p. 69). 
At least part of the reason for Congress' failure to make better policy may 
be attributed to pressure from interest groups, as in the lumber producers .example above. 
Further evidence of this was manifested when the National Performance Review under 
the Clinton Administration enacted its pledge to reduce the national deficit and improve 
government efficiency. 
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As part of its mandate, it investigated various forms of maritime subsidies 
and protection and eventually proposed their elimination. When this 
portion of the report was leaked, however, there was an outcry from 
maritime labor leaders, who had given President Bill Clinton considerable 
support during his election campaign. (Ref. 42:p. 69) 
Thus, the plan was abandoned and later the administration introduced the 
Maritime Security Program. However, this program has been criticized because, "The 
program will allow American ship owners to continue to absorb unrealistically high labor 
costs and defray the expense of some of the government restrictions, but it contains no 
incentive for future U.S. Flag operations." (Ref. 42:p. 69). 
Congress is reactive as it creates maritime laws. An example of this came 
about as a result of the Exxon Valdez oil spill. The Oil Pollution Act of 1990 called for 
double hull construction of all tanker ships operating in the U.S. exclusive economic zone 
and also increased owner liability to $1,200 per gross or to $10,000,000 for vessels over 
3,000 gross tons, whichever is greater. This law also allows states to enact liability 
programs that are more stringent than federal legislation. "The potential for considerable 
financial risks and the requirements to use double hall vessels have caused some foreign 
flag companies, such as Shell, to stop operating their tankers in U.S. waters" (Ref. 2:p. 
174-175). 
These are but a few examples of legislation which make it more difficult 
for U.S. shipping companies to compete with foreign companies. Policies with similar 
consequences are addressed in the paragraphs that follow. 
c. United States Coast Guard and American Bureau of Shipping 
The U.S. Coast Guard gives navigational safety and protection of the 
environment a high priority.   However, it allows foreign ships that meet International 
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Maritime Organization (IMO) standards to enter U.S. waters, while imposing stricter 
safety standards on U.S. flag ships (Ref. 42:p. 69). An example of this is the new 
Standards on the Training and Certification of Watchkeepers (STCW). Although this is 
in accordance with the IMO convention, the Coast Guard will administer the U.S. STCW, 
whose provisions exceed the minimum requirements of STCW required by IMO. 
Additionally, the IMO agreement does not provide a mechanism to verify if the country 
that issues a license complies with STCW. Since open registry flag's law enforcement is 
often nonexistent (Ref. 2: p. 178-179), there is concern that the U.S. merchant marine 
again is incurring higher costs as a result of standards that might not be enforced for some 
shipping companies under open registry. 
The American Bureau of Shipping (ABS) is a classification society that 
holds high standards for structure and equipment of U.S. flag-ships. ABS also assesses 
the quality of a company's management structure, as required by the International Safety 
Organization (ISO)-900 guidelines. Nevertheless, ISM approval for some foreign flag 
vessels is obtained through their own classifications societies, some of which are of 
questionable reputation (Ref. 2:p. 178-179). Again, the cost for this certification may be 
higher for U.S. ships relative to some open registry vessels. 
d.        Shipyards 
As the number of U.S. flag ships have dwindled, so have shipyards. The 
smaller yards that service the Jones Act trade market have developed advanced 
techniques and can offer quality at competitive prices.   However, most of the larger 
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shipyards specialize in military vessel construction and only a few have received orders 
to build merchant tankers. 
The larger yards, however, are not usually perceived as being competitive. 
It is strange that the U.S. industry can lead the world in designing and 
building high-tech aircraft, yet lag so far behind in heavy industrial 
shipbuilding (Ref. 43 :p. 108). 
U.S. commercial shipbuilding prices are 2 to 3 times those for comparable 
vessels built in the Orient, particularly in the Republic of Korea and new 
building delivery times are twice as long as those of foreign yards for 
comparable ships (Congressional Budget Office, 1984: National Research 
Council, 1984a). U.S. ship repair costs are also higher in U.S. Yards (Ref. 
41 :p. 15-16). 
Under the Jones Act, U.S. shipping companies find it difficult to avoid 
these costs. In 1920, Congress passed the Jones Act to protect its domestic shipping 
routes. This act extends protection to U.S. shipyards by requiring U.S. Shipping 
companies involved in domestic trade to build and repair ships at U.S. shipyards. 
Additionally, U.S. shipping companies may buy and repair ships overseas but there are 
penalties that must be paid. These long-standing requirements have contributed to the 
long-term decline of U.S. waterborne trading opportunities and in the U.S. flag fleet (Ref. 
41:p.63). 
According to a study conducted by the National Research Council's 
Marine Board, American shipyards lag behind in four major technology categories: 
• business-process technologies - the principal "up front management 
processes and other management activities, notably technologies for 
preliminary design, bidding, estimating, and sourcing, that are linked to 
the marketing capabilities of shipbuilders; 
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system   technologies   -   the   engineering   systems,   such   as   process 
engineering and computer-aided design and manufacturing, that support 
the shipyard operations; 
shipyard production process technology - the methods used in fabricating, 
assembling, erecting, and outfitting vessels; and 
new materials and product technologies - the innovations, including new 
designs and new components, that meet particular market needs (Ref. 
44 :p. 2). 
e.        Shipping Companies 
Since shipping companies are the organizations that own the ships and 
their business operations, they can be said to be the heart of the maritime industry. Given 
this position, changes in the environmental context, inputs in system direction in the form 
of policy, and the forces resulting from interactions with the other organizations in the 
maritime system are bound to have a significant impact on shipping companies. The 
decline of U.S. shipping companies and U.S. registered ships can be attributed to all of 
the above. 
As shown above, shipping companies are burdened by the restrictive 
policies resulting from actions of the other organizations within the maritime systems 
framework. These internal burdens make it considerably more difficult for U.S. shipping 
companies to compete in the external environment, where shipping companies under 
foreign flags of convenience dominate trade. Although the United States, the world's 
largest trading nation, contributes nearly 20 percent of the world's maritime trade, its 
merchant fleet carried less than three percent of this cargo in 1998 (Ref. 43 :p. 105). In 
1999, open-registry ships accounted for 92.1 percent of the world's dead weight tonnage 
capacity. This coupled with lower freight rates that these ships can offer, lead to a 
conclusion that they probably carry a similar percentage of the world's ocean-born cargo. 
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Foreign-flag ships are able to offer lower freight rates because they incur "lower labor 
costs, lower operation costs, taxes, capital costs, and crewing expenses, with less 
government regulation and costly litigation" (Ref. 43 :p. 105). 
/ Maritime Administration 
The Maritime Security Act of 1996 created the Maritime Security Program 
(MSP) which charges MARAD with promoting a privately owned, U.S. registered, and 
U.S. crewed dry cargo vessel inventory that can fulfill the national security requirements 
and remain competitive in world commerce (Ref. 16:p. 75).   To this end, MARAD 
manages funding and maintenance of the National Defense Reserve Fleet, which includes 
the Ready Reserve Force (RRF); coordinates with the Military Sealift Command (MSC) 
the number and types of ships to be acquired, and what and when ships should be 
activated in defense emergencies; liaisons with the U.S.  Transpotation Command 
(USTRANSCOM) on sealift policy issues;  establishes agreements with the U.S. Coast 
Guard and ABS over certifications and inspections;   works out agreements with the 
Environmental Protection Administration for disposal of obsolete NDRF ships;  awards 
RRF management contracts to U.S. flag shipping companies (Ref. 11); cooperates with 
USTRANSCOM to develop the Voluntary Intermodal Sealift Agreement;    provides 
financial assistance to the U.S. merchant marine and shipyards for ship construction and 
yard modernization under Title IX of the Federal Ship Financing Program of the 
Merchant Marine Act of 1936 (Ref. 16); monitors U.S. cargo preference laws; funds 
maritime education and training at the U.S. Merchant Marine Academy and also assists 
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State maritime schools. Even this list does not fully disclose MARAD's entire scope of 
responsibilities. 
As indicated above, MARAD's broad area of responsibility within the 
maritime systems framework ties it to most organizations within the maritime systems 
framework as it works towards moving the systems components towards improvement of 
the maritime industry. Nevertheless, MARAD faces some challenges because it is not in 
a position to resolve the critical issues that affect the maritime industry, as discussed 
above under the other organizations. Thus the U.S. flag fleet is expected to continue its 
decline (Ref. 29:p. 82). "Once the present aging fleet has been retired, the owners will 
continue with the program of foreign-flag replacements that are already well under way" 
(Ref. 42:p. 69). Thus, under the present conditions, it is highly probable that the U.S. 
will not be able to fulfill surge requirements without foreign flag vessels. 
The objective then is to revitalize the U.S. merchant marine with enough 
mariners and ships to provide the sealift capability necessary during a national 
contingency. 
2. Search - Identifying Alternatives 
Although there are many organizations in this system, the following will examine 
three of these as alternatives to illustrate that only those able to set direction for the entire 
system have the means to effectively pursue systems objectives. The following 
alternatives might be considered: 
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One alternative is to do nothing and simply leave things as they are. Under this 
alternative MARAD can continue its efforts to keep the maritime industry afloat with the 
current programs and policies. 
As a second alternative, the Department of Defense can capitalize on the shortage 
of merchant mariners and the aging RRF under MARAD to pressure to Congress and 
gain control of the RRF. It would then have direct control of more of its sealift 
capability. 
In third alternative, Congress can develop policy that reduces the restrictions, 
penalties and higher operating costs faced by the U.S. flag shipping companies. 
Specifically: Congress could eliminate requirements to build or repair ships in U.S. 
shipyards; allow ships to employ only the crew necessary to operate efficiently and 
safely; enforce same standards on foreign ships calling on U.S. ports just as enforced on 
U.S. shipping; and promote a competitive market by removing other requirements that 
overburden U.S. shipping companies. 
3. Forecasting 
In the near future, the United States will likely continue to be involved in conflicts 
throughout the world, as it protects its interests and those of its allies. Thus, the 
requirement for sealift capability in support of such operations can be expected. 
However, the situation with the U.S. Merchant Marine will not get better if the status quo 
is maintained. 
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4.        Modeling 
As suggested by Thomas R. Dye in his work Understanding Public Policy, there 
are several policy models at work here. Over the years, political science has developed 
several models to aid in understanding public policy (Ref. 45 :p. 18). Given the 
complexity and numerous entities involved with the maritime industry, probably all of 
the nine models Dye describes apply at one level or another. However, the discussion 
below will focus on the models that seem to have the greatest impact on the maritime 
industry. 
One of these nine models is actually a very simplistic systems model. But since 
this model has already been covered at length above, suffice it to say that this model 
describes the maritime framework on the macro level as a bureaucratic political system at 
the high end of complexity. There are many players and no unitary actor or single 
objective. 
The other models discussed here include the group model, the game theory model, 
and the institutional model. In the group model theory, groups struggle to influence 
public policy in their favor. Thus, on the micro level, each organization is operating from 
the group model theory and the ineffective maritime policy has been the result of the 
struggle amongst these groups. According to Dye, "game theory is a form of rationalism, 
but it is applied in competitive situations in which the outcome depends on what two or 
more participants do" (Ref. 45:p. 33). With so many organizations involved here, a few 
of them engage in this type of game to achieve optimum payoff after considering all of 
the opponent's possible moves.   Last and most significant is the institutional model, in 
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which public policy is adopted, implemented, and enforced by a government institution. 
With this in mind the alternatives can now be put in the context of a model: 
The alternative to do nothing would simply keep the current bureaucratic/political 
system in place at the macro level while the group model would remain at the micro 
level. The impact of this alternative can be expected to remain as it is now. Under this 
alternative, MARAD's role in the maritime industry has been established under the 
institutional model. The Maritime Security Act of 1996 clearly gives MARAD the 
responsibility to pursue the objective identified above. While MARAD's current role also 
puts it in a position where it can help push for collaboration between the significant 
stakeholders, it is doubtful it can achieve an equilibrium that produces maximum group 
gain, given each group's rational commitment to self preservation. 
Although DoD sometimes runs under an institutional model, it will fall under the 
Game Theory Model in the event it vies for control of the RRF. The U.S. Navy engaged 
in this type of game theory with MARAD as it attempted to gain control over the RRF. It 
exposed the failures by RRF ships and went as far as buying some RRF ships. The Navy 
lost when Congress gave these RRF ships to MARAD and made it clear that MARAD 
would retain control of the RRF. This led to legislation in 1987, which reaffirmed 
MARAD as the sole authority to acquire and maintain RRF ships (Ref. 11 :p. 8). Given 
this previous decision, it is not likely that DoD would get a favorable response from 
Congress. Additionally, while taking over the RRF would give DoD greater control over 
sealift capabilities, this move would have no significant impact on the objective; control 
of the RRF would simply shift but would not necessarily revitalize the merchant marine 
or increase surge capacity. 
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Policy created by Congress to lift the burden of regulation from the U.S. shipping 
companies would have the greatest impact on the U.S. maritime industry. Eliminating 
requirements to build ships in the U.S. would result in significant savings to U.S. 
shipping companies. While it may be argued that this would have dire consequences on 
U.S. shipyards, most large shipyards are employed in naval construction with very few 
involved in commercial construction. Additionally; 
Most recent proposals to aid the U.S. shipbuilding industry-such as a 
federally funded merchant shipbuilding program, renewed construction 
subsidies, a federally backed maritime redevelopment bank, and expanded 
cargo preference-are either too small in scope to be of significant impact, 
do not address the most serious problems, or would create larger 
problems.(Ref. 41 :p. 71) 
A policy that allowed U.S. shipping companies to crew their ships with only the 
personnel necessary for safe and efficient operations would also result in significant 
savings. However, this would certainly have a negative impact on union job control. The 
combined savings from the above would transfer to the U.S. public in the form of lower 
freight rates while increasing the competitiveness of U.S. shipping companies. 
A policy that enforces the same standards for all ships, whether U.S. flag or 
domestic, levels the competitive field and does not force U.S. flag ships to incur costs 
higher than those of open flag registry vessels calling upon U.S. ports. In this case, there 
would be an increase in costs to foreign flag-ships, which would in turn share the costs 
with consumers. 
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5.        Synthesis 
As noted above, keeping the status quo will not revitalize the U.S. Maritime 
Industry or ensure an adequate RRF. While MARAD has made significant efforts 
towards achieving this objective, current policy does not seem to sway the continued 
decline of the U.S. maritime industry. Hence, it is not a good alternative. 
An attempt by a DoD organization to take over the RRF was rejected by Congress 
in the recent past. Therefore, it is not likely to receive a warmer reception the second 
time around. Furthermore, this alternative does nothing to achieve the objective at hand 
and is therefore not a good alternative. 
The best alternative is for Congress to set policy that increases the 
competitiveness of the U.S. maritime industry. This increase in competitiveness could be 
used as an incentive to bring ships back under U.S. flag. This would in turn generate 
more sailing jobs and thus begin the first step towards revitalizing the U.S. maritime 
industry. 
E.       CONCLUSION 
This chapter cannot begin to address the complexity of the dilemma facing the 
U.S. Merchant Marine, or the important role it plays in national strategy. However, the 
simple models employed here were helpful in breaking down the intricate and 
challenging maritime industry. This made it possible to lay out coherently some of the 
most significant components that make up the maritime systems framework to aid 
analysis and better illuminate the problem at hand. 
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The systems model indicated that the most significant problem lay in the system 
inputs, specifically in the area of direction setting policy. The process of policy analysis 
began by clarifying the problem and determined the objective: To revitalize the U.S. 
merchant marine with enough mariners and ships to provide the sealift capability 
necessary during a national contingency. It also examined a few alternatives and their 
impact, to identify the best alternative for achieving the objective. Through policy, 
Congress is the organization that can most effectively revitalize the U.S. merchant marine 
with sufficient mariners and ships to provide the sealift capability necessary during a 
national contingency. 
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VI.    NATIONAL SECURITY SEALIFT REQUIREMENTS AND 
THE AMERICAN MERCHANT MARINE CAPACITY 
A.        NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY AND CAPACITY REQUIREMENTS 
The United States is the only remaining superpower. Its military is second to 
none, with the most advanced technology and the best-trained personnel. In recent years, 
the U.S. military has become a useful diplomatic tool and a police force supporting 
human rights and democracy around the world. Every year, as part of the military budget 
process, the President of the United States lays out the nation's National Security 
Strategy and from that the Joint Chiefs of Staff develop the National Military Strategy. 
These two documents are the sources that call for the requirement to prepare to fight two 
nearly simultaneous major theater wars (MTW). Specifically, the National Security 
Strategy for 1997 states: 
At the high end of responding to crises is fighting and winning major 
theater wars. This mission will remain the ultimate test of our Total Force 
our active and reserve military components and one in which it must 
always succeed. For the foreseeable future, the United States, in concert 
with regional allies, must remain able to deter credibly and defeat large- 
scale, cross-border aggression in two distant theaters in overlapping time 
frames. (Ref. 46) 
The National Military Strategy for 1997 follows that by stating: 
As a global power with worldwide interests, it is imperative that the 
United States be able to deter and defeat nearly simultaneous, large-scale, 
cross-border aggression in two distant theaters in overlapping time 
frames, preferably in concert with regional allies....The capability to fight 
two major theater wars initiated in rapid succession is of critical 
importance as it helps deter opportunism, promote stability, and provide 
the depth and flexibility to deal with unanticipated challenges. (Ref. 47) 
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Based on these two strategy statements, each individual service developes plans 
and force structures that would be needed to support and sustain the nation's forces and 
meet the two MTW requirements. Much of the current estimates are based on Operation 
Desert Storm/Desert Shield lessons learned and models. The most recent numbers come 
from the models run in the recently completed Mobility Requirements Study - 2005 
(MRS-05), a comprehensive review of the military's airlift and sealift capabilities. 
Designed to account for the evolutions and changes in the Department of Defense since 
the last Mobility Requirements Study conducted in 1995, MRS-05 drew on large volumes 
of data in defining mobility requirements for 2005.   From all of the data and related 
simulations, the required sealift capabilities were estimated.  The immense complexities 
involved with this calculation are far beyond the scope of this thesis.  Over 32 different 
factors, such as timing, port location and availability, individual ship characteristics and 
load out are all included in the calculations.   The numbers represented in Table 7 are a 
final estimate of the total cargo requirement to be moved in the most likely simulation of 




Unit Equipment Dry Sustainment 
First Major Theater War 
2,120,000 800,000 









Table 7. Two Major Theater War Estimated Dry Cargo Requirements 
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To get an idea of the cargo capacity that would be required for a two MTW 
strategy, the above numbers can be compared with Appendix F which lists the strategic 
sealift tonnage moved in the Gulf War, broken down into the individual sources. For the 
purposes of this thesis, a month-to-month break down of each individual sealift asset 
would be too complex. Additionally, it would only serve to duplicate the more extensive 
and sophisticated techniques used in developing the MRS-05 and is not the focus of this 
research. 
B.        SEALIFT ASSETS AND PRIORITIES 
The required tonnage is to be moved by several different strategic sealift fleets. 
For the ease of data manipulation and to get the worst-case scenario, this discussion 
assumes that no foreign vessels would be contracted; the United States would rely on the 
U.S. flag commercial fleet as well as U.S. government owned vessels for sealift capacity. 
The Department of Defense has set out priorities for contingency sealift and which 
programs would be activated first and in what order. This priority order is as follows: 
1. Prepositioned Vessels 
2. Fast Sealift Ships 
3. Ready Reserve Fleet 
4. Volunteers (Commercial Charters) 
5. U.S. Flag 
6. Foreign Flag 
7. Voluntary Intermodal Sealift Agreement Activation 
a. Stage I (Sealift requirements early in a contingency or MTW) 
b. Stage II (Additional requirements for a single MTW) 
c. Stage III (Unforecasted Requirements beyond Stages I and II - Includes 
MSP vessels) 
8. Sealift Readiness Program activation 
9. Requisitioning of U.S. flag and Effective U.S. Control of foreign-flag vessels. 
(Ref. 21) 
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Each of these sealift assets, with the exception of volunteers and foreign-flag 
vessels, will be discussed below along with a list of vessels and approximate tonnages, if 
available. 
1.        Military Sealift Command Prepositioning Program 
Owned and operated by USTRANSCOM's subordinate command, the Military 
Sealift Command, the Prepositioning Program consists of 33 civilian-manned vessels. 
The program is essentially a fleet of vessels preloaded with equipment and supplies, and 
strategically located around the world close to potential crisis areas.   These vessels 
provide a fast response to support the initial troop deployments while the rest of the 
military and sealift capacity is being activated. The Combat Prepositioning Force (CPF) 
consists of thirteen vessels designed to support Army operations; they carry enough 
combat material, food, water, and other essentials to sustain two Army heavy brigades, 
including 6,000 soldiers, for 30 days. The thirteen Maritime Prepositioning Force (MPF) 
vessels are split into three squadrons, located in the Mediterranean, the Indian Ocean at 
Diego Garcia, and the Western Pacific at Guam and Saipan. Each squadron has sufficient 
equipment, supplies and ammunition to support a Marine Corps Air Ground Task Force 
for 30 days. The final seven vessels make up the Logistics Prepositioning Force (LPF), 
which serves Air Force, Navy and Defense Logistics Agency needs and includes one ship 
that serves as a Navy field hospital. Two aviation support vessels that can act as mobile 
Marine Corps aircraft maintenance facilities are also part of the program (Ref. 9). 
Included in this fleet are the Large Medium-Speed Roll-On/Roll-Off (LMSR) 
vessels currently being delivered to the fleet or under construction. The initial order is 
for eleven of the new Bob Hope class of LMSR, which will be added to the MPF fleet as 
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they are launched. Once all eleven of the ships are delivered, the MPF will have a vastly 
improved sealift capability. Figure 2 depicts one of the MPF vessels, the MV 2nd LT 
JOHN P BOBO. Figure 3 is the first of the new LMSR class of ships, the USNS BOB 
HOPE. Table 7 lists the current Prepositioning Program vessels and their approximate 
cargo capacity, broken up into their respective forces and squadrons. 
nd- Figure 2.        MPF Squadron One vessel MV 2m LT JOHN P BOBO (T-AK 3008) 







CARGO       CARGO 
, CAPACITY CAPACITY CREW 
SQ FT            TEU 
Maritime Prepositioning Ship Squadron One 
MV 2ND LT JOHN P. BOBO T-AK 3008 Mediterranean 44,330 152,185 530 38 
SS SGT MATEJ KOCAK T-AK 3005 Mediterranean 48,754 152,236 361 34 
SS PFC EUGENE A. OBREGON T-AK 3006 Mediterranean 48,754 152,236 361 34 
SS MAJ STEPHEN W. PLESS T-AK 3007 Mediterranean 48,754 152,236 361 34 
MV 1 ST LT HARRY L. MARTIN T-AK 3015 Mediterranean 47,777 127,000 767 36 
Maritime Prepositioning Ship Squadron Two 
MV PFC JAMES ANDERSON Jr. T-AK 3002 Diego Garcia 46,552 121,595 361 32 
MV PFC WILLIAM B. BAUGH T-AK 3001 Diego Garcia 46,552 121,595 361 32 
MV 1ST LT ALEX BONNYMAN T-AK 3003 Diego Garcia 46,552 121,595 361 32 
MV CPL LOUIS J. HAUGE Jr. T-AK 3000 Diego Garcia 46,552 121,595 361 32 
MV PVT FRANKLIN J. PHILLIPS T-AK 3004 Diego Garcia 46,552 121,595 361 32 
Maritime Prepositioning Ship Squadron Three 
MV SGT WILLIAM R. BUTTON T-AK 3012 Guam/Saipan 44,330 152,185 530 38 
MV 1ST LT BALDEMERO LOPEZ T-AK 3010 Guam/Saipan 44,330 152,185 530 38 
MV 1 ST LT JACK LUMMUS T-AK 3011 Guam/Saipan 44,330 152,185 530 38 
MV PFC DEWAYNE T. WILLIAMS T-AK 3009 Guam/Saipan 44,330 152,185 530 38 
Combat Prepositioning Ships 
MV LT COL JOHN D. PAGE T-AK 4496 Diego Garcia 48,780 10,227 1,466 25 
SS GOPHER STATE T-ACS 4 Guam/Saipan 17,130 45,000 300 33 
MV AMERICAN CORMORANT T-AK 2062 Diego Garcia 38,571 21 
MV STRONG VIRGINIAN T-AK 9205 Diego Garcia 16,428 1,413 23 
MV LTC CALVIN P. TITUS T-AK 5089 Guam/Saipan 48,780 10,227 1,466 25 
MV SP5 ERIC G. GIBSON T-AK 5091 Guam/Saipan 48,780 10,227 1,466 25 
USNS DAHL T-AKR312 Diego Garcia 72,718 394,673 29 
USNS WATSON T-AKR310 Diego Garcia 72,718 394,673 29 
USNS BOB HOPE T-AKR 300 Diego Garcia 69,365 397,413 29 
USNS SISLER T-AKR311 Diego Garcia 72,718 394,673 29 
USNS RED CLOUD T-AKR 315 Diego Garcia 72,737 394,673 29 
USNS CHARLTON T-AKR 316 Diego Garcia 72,718 394,673 29 
Logistics Prepositioning Ships 
MV MAJOR BERNARD F. FISHER T-AK 4396 Diego Garcia 48,780 10,227 1,466 21 
MV CAPT. STEVEN L. BENNETT T-AK 4296 Mediterranean 53,727 1,526 25 
MV BUFFALO SOLDIER T-AK 322 Diego Garcia 41,002 Tanker 19 
SS CAPE JACOB r-AK 5029 Diego Garcia 12,693 68,084 36 
SS PETERSBURG r-AOT 5075 3uam/Saipan Tanker 33 
SS POTOMAC r-AOT181 Diego Garcia 35,255 Tanker 33 
USNS HENRY J. KAISER r-AOT 187 Diego Garcia 20706 Tanker 27 
SS WRIGHT r-AVB 3         1 JS East Coast 12,450 36,700 426 40 
SS CURTISS r-AVB 4        p JS West Coast 12,450 36,700 426 40 
TOTAL 1,536,955 4,550,778 16,260 1,088 
Table 8.          Military S< ;alift Comrm md PreDOsition me Proerar n Vessels. T, nr.ari rvn 
Cargo Capacity, and Crew Requirements. 
72 
2.        Fast Sealift Ships 
The eight Fast Sealift Ships (FSS) are among the fastest cargo ships in the world. 
All were originally built as container ships for Sea-Land Service, Inc., Port Elizabeth, 
New Jersey. However, they were not cost-effective compared with other commercial 
merchant ships because of their high fuel consumption. The ships can travel at speeds of 
up to 33 knots; they are capable of sailing from the U.S. East Coast to Europe in just six 
days, and to the Persian Gulf via the Suez Canal in 18 days, thus ensuring rapid delivery 
of military equipment in a crisis. Together, these eight ships are capable of moving 93% 
of an Army Mechanized Division in one voyage (Ref. 49: p843). Seven of the eight were 
responsible for moving approximately 13% of all Gulf War cargo (Ref. 50:p. 116). Fast 
Sealift Ships are roll-on/roll-off and lift-on/lift-off ships, equipped with on-board cranes 
and self-contained ramps that enable the ships to off-load onto lighterage when anchored 
at sea or in ports where shore facilities for unloading equipment are unavailable. The 
vessels are specially suited to transport heavy or bulky unit equipment, such as tanks, 
large wheeled vehicles and helicopters (Ref. 51). 
Figure 4 is the USNS DENEBOLA, one of the FSS fleet: Table 8 lists the eight 
FSS vessels and their characteristics. 
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TOTAL 388,279 208,349 2,672.440 128 208 192 336 
Table 9. Fast Sealift Ship characteristics 
3.        Ready Reserve Force 
Owned by MARAD, the Ready Reserve Force (RRF) is the largest source of 
quick response shipping available to deploy military forces overseas, both in number of 
ships and cargo carrying capacity. The RRF currently contains 91 ships. The operation 
and maintenance of these vessels is contracted out to commercial ship operators and the 
ships are kept in various states of readiness. The operators have from four to thirty days 
to man and activate the ship if called upon.   Those vessels in the highest state of 
readiness, four and five day, are kept in a reduced operating status and manned with a 
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caretaker crew of nine to ten mariners. Once the ships are activated, they are placed 
under the operational command of the Military Sealift Command. The crew is then 
rounded out to its full complement by the unions, as required. The fleet is composed of a 
militarily useful mix of breakbulk, RO/RO, heavy lift, tanker, LASH, troopships and 
crane ships. A majority of the RRF vessels are home ported at either James River, 
Virginia: Beaumont Texas; or the San Francisco Bay area, California. A short 
description of each type of vessel in the RRF follows. 
a. Breakbulk 
The oldest type of vessel, a breakbulk is a labor and time intensive vessel 
to load and unload. Most commercial carriers have eschewed this type of vessel in favor 
of faster and more efficient container vessels. Breakbulk vessels are very useful for 
military applications, due to their ability to handle odd shaped or heavy equipment. This 
flexibility explains why there are fifteen of them in the RRF, despite their slow 
load/unload times and higher crew requirements. 
b. Roll On/Roll Off 
RO/RO vessels are considered to be the most militarily useful sealift 
vessel. With stem ramps and side ramps, vehicles and cargo can simply be driven 
onboard, secured, and driven off again at the destination. Requiring fewer crewmembers 
than a breakbulk, RO/ROs have become the type of sealift vessel owned by the U.S. 
government and a focus of sealift planners. In addition to the FSS and the LMSRs in the 
MPF, the RRF has 29 RO/ROs in its inventory. 
c        Lighter Aboard Ship and SEABEE 
Less common, Lighter Aboard Ship (LASH) and SEABEE vessels are 
essentially barge carriers.   These vessels load and unload barges, called lighters, either 
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via a crane or an elevator. Developed around the same time as the container vessel, 
LASH and SEABEE's never gained the same popularity äs container ships. Many of 
these vessels have been scrapped, sold or converted to container ships. The military finds 
these vessels useful because the lighter can handle larger equipment than containers. 
They also provide flexibility to unload this type of vessel in an unimproved port by 
anchoring out and towing the much smaller lighters to the pier. The manning level is 
comparable to a container vessel or RO/RO. The RRF has four LASH and three 
SEABEE vessels. Figure 5 is the SS GREEN HARBOUR, one of the RRF LASH ships. 
Figure 5 SS GREEN HARBOUR, LASH Vessel 
d. Crane Ship 
The crane ship, designated as a T-ACS, is a vital part of the RRF and has 
been used extensively in almost every RRF call-up. These vessels are essentially floating 
cranes. Their purpose, besides lifting and carrying heavy cargo and acting as heavy lift 
vessels, is to pull alongside a pier that does not have its own cargo handling equipment 
and serve as the unloading gear for other ships. Nested with one side to the dock and the 
other to the ship to be unloaded, a T-ACS uses its crane to discharge the other vessel's 
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cargo. These are relatively labor-intensive vessels for their small size and comparatively 
small cargo capacity. But this is more than equaled by their usefulness in unimproved 
ports. The RRF has ten of these vessels. The SS GRAND CANYON STATE is depicted 
in Figure 6. 
Figure 6. SS GRAND CANYON STATE, T-ACS Crane Ship 
e.        Special Mission 
The RRF also contains several vessels for special purposes. These vessels 
include four Offshore Petroleum Discharge Ships (OPDS), two aviation maintenance 
vessels assigned to the LPF, troop carrying ships, and several small tankers. Two 
specialized oil tankers normally included with the RRF have continued to support MSC's 
Prepositioning Program and are included in the APF. One of the aviation maintenance 
vessels is pictured in Figure 7 
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Figure 7.        SS CURTIS, Aviation Maintenance Vessel 
The RRF was a major participant in Operation Desert Storm/Desert Shield. 
Approximately 79 vessels were activated for the conflict and carried more than 28% of 
all cargo sent to the Arabian Gulf (Ref. 50:p. 116).   The lessons learned from the 
activations are still appreciated today.   Problems with outdated or poorly maintained 
engines, bridge equipment and manning shortages spurred much research and review of 
the RRF. MARAD has done much to improve force readiness. As the November 1994 
GAO report. Ship Readiness Has Improved but Other Concerns Remain, states, "The 
readiness of the RRF has improved since the Persian Gulf War due to the $1 billion 
invested in the program. Officials from the Military Sealift Command, American Bureau 
of Shipping, and MARAD agree that the satisfactory readiness of RRF ships is primarily 
due to the identification and repair of machinery deficiencies during and after the war." 
(Ref. 39:p. 20)   A complete list of all the current RRF vessels can be found in Appendix 
G. 
The RRF is actually a subset of a larger fleet.  This fleet, the National Defense 
Reserve Fleet (NDRF) consists of 254 vessels, including the 91 RRF ships, primarily dry 
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cargo and tankers. At its peak in 1950, the NDRF had 2,277 ships in lay-up. However, 
the last time vessels of the NDRF were used, other than the RRF, was during the Vietnam 
conflict; 172 vessels were activated to meet military requirements rather than 
requisitioning commercial vessels away from their commercial routes (Ref. 52). Many 
debate the usefulness of the current NDRF vessels, especially considering many of the 
vessels are over 40 years old. Considering the condition of these vessels, their age, and 
the time that would be required to activate them, they are not considered in this thesis. 
4.        Voluntary Intermodal Sealift Agreement/Maritime Security Program 
The Voluntary Intermodal Sealift Agreement (VISA) was created in February 
1997 after approving the Maritime Security Act of 1996 and establishing the Maritime 
Security Program (MSP). As of January 1999, there were 109 American flag vessels 
enrolled in VISA. This includes 89 container ships, 12 RO/RO ships, 4 LASH, and 4 
breakbulk ships. In addition to that, 52 ocean supply vessels and over 100 ocean-going 
tugs and barges are enrolled (Ref. 21 :p. 10). The companies enrolled in the plan are 
listed in Table 4, but an actual list of the 109 vessels could not be located. As per the 
sealift priority order listed in Section A above, VISA and MSP vessels are one of the 
final assets the military would utilize. This minimizes the potential impact activation 
would have on the participating commercial companies supplying the capacity when 
called upon. Naturally, the company must prove that it can support the capacity it is 
enrolling prior to being added to the program. 
One very important characteristic of the VISA/MSP program is the coordination 
between the shipping companies if the Stages are ever activated.   The Department of 
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Defense can use a proportion of the total system capacity, rather than naming specific 
vessels. Carriers are allowed to coordinate with each other to provide capacity on 
activation. This provides flexibility, while minimizing the disruption to commercial 
shipping operations. Coordination also helps to protect market share, where a temporary 
withdrawal from a given lane can have serious long-term effects for a shipping firm (Ref. 
21 :p. 12). 
Since an actual list of vessels enrolled in VISA was not found, data from the 
MRS-05 study must be used. Tables 9 and 10 list the VISA Capacity and the break down 
of the VISA fleet projected to 2005 (Ref. 48: Appendix K). 















Table 10. Cumulative VISA Capacity Commitment 2005 
Ship Type Number        Sq Ft TEU       MTON 
RO/RO 3            479,696 1,476 0 
Car Transport 6            745,023 0 0 
LASH           """' 4                 0 1,152       14730 
Containership 56                0 "l46,63"f'"*"   0 
Total 69 1,224,719 143,259     147,260 
Table 11.        VISA Fleet Representation 
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5. Sealift Readiness Program 
The Sealift Readiness Program (SRP) is an agreement between U.S. Flag carriers 
and MSC for acquiring ships and related equipment. It is the precursor to VISA, created 
in 1936 after passing the Merchant Marine Act of 1936. In fact, public law states "No 
vessel may receive construction differential subsidy or operational differential subsidy if 
it is not offered for enrollment in a sealift readiness program approved by the Secretary of 
Defense." (Ref. 53) Essentially, under either public law or as a precondition for carrying 
military cargoes, U.S. ship owners and U.S. Flag ships are required to commit 50 percent 
of their cargo capacity to MSC for use during less-than-full mobilization, contingencies, 
and emergencies. 
As per the priority of sealift, the SRP would only be activated if available 
commercial charter shipping is insufficient, government owned sealift is not available or 
inadequate, VISA Stage III is activated, and the Secretary of Defense, in coordination 
with the Secretary of Transportation, gives final authorization. However, the SRP has 
never been activated (Ref. 19:p. 15-16). At the time of Desert Storm/Desert Shield, there 
were 122 militarily useful vessels in the program, 99 dry cargo and 23 tankers. 
USTRANSCOM ended up using 62 of the SRP vessels without actually activating the 
program (Ref. 50:p. 124). There are ships still enrolled in the SRP, but no list of them 
was found. It is assumed that the vessels still receiving ODS contracts are enrolled in the 
program. A ship will remain in the program until its obligation expires or it enrolls in 
VISA. For the purposes of this thesis, the tonnage of these vessels will not be 
considered. 
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6. Requisitioning U.S. Flag and Effective U.S. Control of Foreign-Flag 
Vessels 
The Roosevelt Administration devised the Effective U.S. Control (EUSC) concept 
on the eve of World War II to circumvent the Neutrality Act.   U.S. ship owners were 
encouraged to register ships in Panama and Honduras so that U.S. aid could be 
transported to European "allies" before the United States officially entered the conflict 
(Ref. 28).    This concept of "effective control" by the United States in times of 
emergencies applies to vessels flying a Flag of Convenience (FoC) and where either the 
shipowning company or the long-term charter is majority owned by U.S. nationals. 
Under this program, ship owners enter into a voluntary contract with the Maritime 
Administration, called an "Effective Control Commitment Agreement."  MARAD may 
requisition the vessel for service in time of emergency, and may, if necessary, purchase it 
and transfer the vessel to U.S. Flag. In return for this, the ship owner receives free U.S. 
war risk insurance and charter lines (Ref. 2:p. 120). 
Labor unions and American shipyard companies have lobbied against this 
program, feeling that if U.S. companies were no longer able to operate under a FoC, most 
would be forced to "come home" and boost the sagging industry. Of course, the flip side 
of this is that some companies may just fold.   Regardless, the labor unions lobbied to 
repeal certain tax deferral benefits available to U.S. companies using FoCs, in an effort to 
bring back jobs.  In 1986, their efforts were successful and the Tax Reform Act passed 
that year eliminated that benefit. Since then, the EUSC fleet has dwindled. From 1985 to 
1994, the deadweight tonnage of the fleet fell from 37.0 million tons to 19.8 million, the 
number of bulk carriers fell from 73 to 33, and the number of tankers fell from 225 to 129 
(Ref. 2:p.  125).    EUSC was used in Korea, Vietnam and the Gulf War without 
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transferring any vessels to the U.S. Flag. However, the majority of the eligible vessels 
are comparatively slow, large bulk tankers or dry bulk with limited military usefulness. 
As of January 1999, this fleet consisted of 214 vessels, of which only 102 were deemed 
militarily useful (Ref. 28). As with the SRP, a list of these vessels was not available; 
considering that they use non-U.S. sailors, these vessels will not be considered. 
B.       DETERMINING THE REQUIRED SHIPS 
Having assessed the tonnage requirements to meet the national security strategy, 
and the number of ships the government has at its disposal for this purpose, the number 
of ships required can now be estimated. A simple comparison of the cargo requirements 
to the cargo capacity provided by the available vessels yields the necessary number of 
ships. Of course, this simple comparison must also take into account the type of cargo 
(i.e. break bulk, bulk, or liquid) and the corresponding ship capacity. Table 11 
summarizes the approximate total tonnage available and approximate total cargo capacity 
from above. 
Asset Gross Tonnage Deadweight Tonnage Cargo Capacity Sq ft Cargo Capacity TEU Crew 
MPF 1,536,955 4,550,778 16,260 1,088 
FFS 388,279 208,349 2,672,440 336 
RRF 1,132,818 1,238,970 5,301,052 UNK 2,404 
MSP/VISA UNK UNK 1,224,719 143,259 UNK 
TOTAL 2,906,702 1,447,319 13,665,362 157,201 3,701 
Table 12.        Summary of Sealift Assets Cargo Capacity and Crew Requirements 
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It is apparent that surge prerequisites in support of the national security strategy 
would require activating the RRF as well as calling up the VISA and MSP fleets. These 
sources should provide sufficient fleet capacity to transport all the necessary military 
equipment and cargo in time of war without relying on allied or foreign-flag vessels. 
This is confirmed by the MRS-05 study, which stated, "The programmed organic dry 
cargo fleet is adequate to meet projected requirements.   The Department [of Defense] 
should execute the current program" (Ref. 48:p. 6). One fact worth mentioning, however, 
is the MRS-05 study included the EUSC fleet and some allied shipping, which added 111 
vessels with approximately 2.3 million square feet of cargo space and over 34,000 TEU 
(Ref. 48:Table G.31).  These vessels, as mentioned, were not included in this thesis due 
to insufficient data and a concentration on the organic commercial and U.S. government- 
owned fleets. 
Another factor not taken into account is the time frame involved in moving the 
cargo. There is no doubt that all the equipment and supplies could be carried on the 
government-owned fleet. However, military planners naturally want the fighting forces 
to be fully equipped as soon as possible to support the soldier on the ground and to end 
the conflict quickly. Taken to the extreme, the military's needs could be met by multiple 
voyages of only a few vessels, but the build up of forces is governed by a timeline 
established by the services, and all efforts must be made to meet those times. 
For future conflicts, sealift capacities may be available from allied and other 
foreign nation fleets, as they were for the conflict against Iraq. However, they are not 
included in this estimate because there are no guarantees that other nations will support 
our next armed conflict; several occurrences of foreign flag baulkers during the Gulf War 
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raised concern over the reliability of contracted foreign vessels. For multiple reasons, 
including political, religious, pay disputes and most often fear of entering a combat zone, 
there were at least thirteen foreign-flag ships carrying U.S. cargo that hesitated or refused 
to enter the gulf (Ref. 50:p. 136). All cargo was eventually transloaded, but these 
instances clearly showed the inherent risks in relying on non-U.S. flag crews and vessels. 
Meeting the tonnage requirement with solely U.S. organic fleet assets would stretch the 
abilities of the merchant marine industry, possibly to the breaking point. Considering 
that commercial carriers would still operate all of their normal vessels, activating all the 
MPS and RRF vessels would create a tremendous manning strain. This strain will be 
considered in the next chapter. 
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VII.   BILLETS AND MARINERS 
A.       THE MARINER ISSUE 
Merchant mariners perform a vital role in time of war. Their importance to the 
war effort has certainly made them a target to enemies with the capability to attack our 
supply lines at sea. In fact during World War II, the United States Merchant Marines 
paid a higher price per capita than any other service, with the exception of the United 
States Marine Corps: 596 merchant ships were sunk with 6,835 men lost at sea (Ref. 54). 
Considering the greater cargo capacity of modern ships, and the fact that there are fewer 
of them today, losses of a similar magnitude would be absolutely devastating. Although 
more ships could be activated from the National Defense Reserve Fleet, replacements for 
lost mariners may be a challenge given the uncertainty about the size of the mariner pool. 
Therefore, researching and tracking the number of mariners is imperative if America 
expects to fulfill surge and sustainment requirements during a national emergency. 
The issue then becomes how to find the number of mariners required as well as 
the number of mariners available to man up the critical sealift vessels as well as the 
commercial fleet through surge and sustainment periods.    The armed forces of the 
country have a reserve system that allows them to pull in additional manpower when the 
regular active forces need bolstering or are otherwise occupied.   The Merchant Marine 
has a similar reserve but there are serious concerns that it is so poorly maintained and 
operated that its reliability is questionable, and as such it is a subject worthy of in depth 
research in itself. There is a thesis to be completed in June 2001 by LCDR Mark Jones 
entitled The Potential Role of the United States Maritime Service (USMS) in Supporting 
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Ready Reserve Force (RRF) Vessel Crewing Needs which will give an analysis of this 
issue. 
Studies on the actual tracking of merchant mariners are scarce. A dozen studies 
have been done on merchant marine manning since 1971, but most cite numbers and 
totals of mariners without supporting data. Additionally, few provide sufficient details on 
how those numbers were determined, and these often use methods that do little to help 
determine the American mariner pool. For instance, one study estimated the worldwide 
supply of mariners by using data supplied by almost two hundred companies, weighted to 
reflect a representative sample of the world fleet (Ref. 55 :p. 1). Few studies even address 
the issue of tracking the employment pool. Appendix H gives a partial list of some of 
these studies. 
For Operation Desert Storm/Desert Shield, MARAD needed nearly 4,200 
additional commercial mariners to crew the RRF. Many of these were former mariners 
who came out of retirement to sail, including some veterans of World War II, Korea, or 
Vietnam. Nearly 200 midshipmen from the U.S. Merchant Marine Academy served on 
these ships as well. In 1990, the average age of a U.S. merchant sailor was 49 years old. 
Many of the mariners that manned the RRF during Desert Storm were in their 60s and 
70s. At least two were in their 80s and the oldest was 92. There were also teenagers 
sailing as well (Ref. 50:p. 132). The Seafarers International Union greatly expanded its 
entry-level training program from 60 to 200 to try and put bodies on the ships. All total, 
approximately 9,800 American mariners served during the Gulf War, often enduring long 
hours with little or no leave. 
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Despite the occasional comment to the contrary, there were manning problems 
during the Gulf War. These were especially apparent in the senior engineers who knew 
how to operate and maintain the steam propulsion plants that dominate most of the RRF. 
The Coast Guard was forced to relax certain licensing and training requirements to ensure 
an adequate supply of mariners (Ref. 50:p. 127). Considering the condition of the 
industry in 1990 with today's industry, a simple extrapolation gives the impression that 
due to the decline of the industry over the last decade, the number of mariners has also 
likely declined. 
B.        THE ORIGINS OF THE MARINER PROBLEM 
In days past, merchant sailors were in an enviable profession. They traveled the 
world to far, exotic places, had a relatively easy job with a lot of time off, and made a 
relatively large amount of money. The typical mariner was relatively reclusive and very 
mobile. The industry was so attractive that no real concern was given to manning the 
merchant fleet during a crisis. The maritime academies were pumping new officers into 
the field and numerous union schools were keeping the unlicensed ranks plump. 
That is no longer the case, as fewer people are taking careers at sea. Many factors 
have reduced the desirability of a career in the maritime industry. Older mariners are 
retiring and mid level sailors are finding more stable jobs on shore. More than that, a 
vital factor is a substantial decrease in pay. In an effort to compete with, cheaper foreign 
companies, American shipping companies have successfully negotiated with the unions 
to reduce pay for the sailors. 
In the modern job market where a new employee at a fast food restaurant is 
making nine dollars an hour, the thought of going out on a ship for months at a time for 
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less money is not overly appealing. Many sailors have found they can work in the shore- 
side industry and actually make more money, without the hassle of leaving home and 
their families. And while merchant ships offer the opportunity to travel all over the 
world, time is money in the modern maritime industry, so port stays are often less than 
eight to twelve hours. The faster the ship can get in and out of port, the more money the 
company can make, or save in port fees. So mariners who sail to see the world get a view 
of it from the cargo docks and more and more do not even have the chance to go out in 
town. 
A recent complication related to sailing in the modern merchant fleet is the 
increased regulatory requirements for merchant mariners sailing between the United 
States and other countries. In order to cut manning costs, most merchant ships no longer 
carry a dedicated Radio Officer and the watchstanding mates are responsible for the 
communications equipment. The STCW convention has also increased the number of 
qualifications the mariner is required to have. Figures 7 and 8 compare the differences in 
required qualifications before and after the STCW implementation. These new 
qualifications can take at least seven weeks to complete and the course fees, per diem, 
and loss of wages could reach $20,000 per mariner (Ref. 26) 
Taking into account the declining fleet, decreasing pay, increased qualification 
requirements, and declining benefits of going to sea compared to staying ashore, it is not 
surprising that the number of qualified mariners in the employment pool is shrinking. 
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Deck Officer Requirements 
1996 2003* 
1. U.S. Coast Guard License 1. U.S. Coast Guard License 
2. Radar Endorsement 2. Radar Endorsement 
- 
3. STCW Endorsement 
- 
4. FCC GMDSS License 
- 
5. GMDSS Operator's Course Endorsement 
- 
6. ARPA Endorsement 
- 
7. Roll-On/Roll-Off Endorsement 
- 
8. Advanced Firefighting Certificate 
- 
9. Bridge Teamwork Course Endorsement 
- 
10. Personal Survival Course Endorsement 
11. Personal Safety & Social Responsibility Course Endorsement 
* All officers seeking renewal of their licenses must produce proof of either recent of sailing or attendance 
at refresher courses within the five-year renewal period. 
Figure 8.         Deck Officer Qualification Requirements 
Engineering Officer Requirements 
1996 2003* 
1. U.S. Coast Guard License 1. U.S. Coast Guard License 
- 
2. STCW Endorsement 
- 
3. Roll-On/Roll-Off Endorsement 
- 
4. Advanced Firefighting Course 
- 
5. Personal Survival Course Endorsement 
- 
6. Personal Safety & Social Responsibility Course Endorsement 
* All officers seeking renewal of their licenses must produce proof of either recent of sailing or attendance 
at refresher courses within the five-year renewal period. 
Figure 9. Engineering Officer Qualification Requirements 
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C.       MARINER TRACKING SYSTEMS 
There is no doubt that the mariner pool is nowhere near what it was at its height. 
But even with the mariner pool dwindling to levels of concern, there seem to be no 
official figures on the exact number of merchant mariners. Given the importance of the 
mariner pool, why is it so difficult to determine how many mariners are in this pool and 
what is being done to correct this problem? 
In the past, there was no real concern about a shortage of mariners, so no methods 
were made to track them. Even the United States Coast Guard, the agency responsible 
for all licensing and qualifications, barely kept any other records of mariners. Most 
shipping companies rely on labor unions for manpower and therefore do not hold 
databases that can describe the mariner pool. As for the labor unions, they protect 
membership information and rarely make that information available. Since Desert Storm 
however, there has been a concerted effort to start assessing and tracking mariners. 
Through three databases, the Coast Guard and Maritime Administration (MARAD) are 
attempting to collect information which will allow for a much more accurate estimation 
of the manpower pool. These are described below. 
1. Merchant Mariner Licensing and Documentation System 
The first of these systems is the Coast Guard Merchant Mariner Licensing and 
Documentation (MMLD) system. This database is compiled from the information 
provided by the mariner on the applications for licenses or unlicensed qualifications. At 
first glance this database appears to be the solution to the problem. Every mariner with 
any qualification is filed in the computer, so it should be no problem to find out the 
eligible number of mariners in the pool.   Unfortunately the database is so large and 
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unwieldy that for this purpose it is almost useless. The information is entered by hand 
and therefore is very prone to errors. There have been instances of five year-olds holding 
a Master's license and other such mistakes. Additionally, very little maintenance is done 
to delete old files; so many mariners in the database could actually be dead. In total, the 
MMLD has over 125,000 mariners on file. This number is misleading as it includes 
every single fishing boat Captain, tug boat engineer, and barge line handler that has a 
Coast Guard qualification and is not set up to get analytical or systematical kinds of 
reports. As stated in an earlier chapter, the main purpose of the United States Coast 
Guard is not to keep a database of merchant mariners. So their lack of focus on updating 
and cleaning the database is understandable. However, the fact remains that what has to 
be sorted out are the qualified deep-water sailors that can sail the American flag 
commercial ships and the Ready Reserve Force vessels (Ref. 56). 
2.        Seafarers Employment Analysis System 
MARAD is working on doing just that with their database called the Seafarers 
Employment Analysis System (SEAS). SEAS is a scaled down version of MMLD and in 
fact gets its data from downloads of the MMLD files. However, MARAD selects only 
certain information to input into SEAS. It takes the Coast Guard information and 
refocuses on the supply-side of qualified mariners. The system analyzes this data and 
compiles mariner employment trends and statistics, and also assesses the amount of 
support available for activation of the reserve surge pool of sealift ships. These 
employment analyses and trends are also critical to characterize the current maritime 
workforce. In fact, the SEAS database is the source for the number of mariners listed in 
the MARAD Annual Report, which lists the total as of April 1999 to be 9,036 (Ref. 57). 
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Currently, SEAS is going through an upgrade process to allow it to better analyze 
and transform the data from the MMLD. Once complete, the upgraded SEAS will be 
able to create data reports and support mariner focused assessments on multiple critical 
issues. Some of these issues include "deep-sea" qualified mariners' trends in 
employment days per year, last time sailed, license or document renewal histories; 
differentiation of deep-sea mariners from domestic or "brown water" sailors; mariner 
pool size changes in the past ten years; and tracking merchant mariners' training for 
compliance with STCW-95 requirements. 
3.        Mariner Tracking System 
The newest system, not even fully operational yet, is the Mariner Tracking 
System. It is being viewed as the long-term response to the problems of tracking the 
mariner manning pool. Begun in 1996, the Mariner Tracking System (MTS) was 
designed to be a subset of the SEAS based on a block on the Coast Guard License 
Application that any mariner wishing to apply for or renew a qualification must fill out. 
The block on the form basically describes the purpose of the system. It requests the 
mariner to sign an agreement that states, 
I consent to voluntary participation in the Mariner's Tracking System to 
be used by the Maritime Administration (MARAD) in the event of a 
national emergency or sealift crisis. In such an emergency situation, 
MARAD would disseminate your contact information to an appropriate 
maritime employment office to determine your availability for possible 
employment on a sealift vessel. This is not a reserve program nor does it 
guarantee call-up for employment. (Ref. 58) 
So far, since its inclusion on the form, over 78,000 mariners have signed up for 
the system. Once again that number is very misleading as it includes fishing boat 
captains and riverboat workers. The eventual goal of the system, which has been funded 
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for further development through fiscal year 2001, is to separate those mariners who are 
actively sailing and concentrate on those not sailing. Those would then be contacted and 
asked if they would be willing, or possibly incentivized, to help man the fleet in a crisis. 
D.       MARINER LABOR POOLS 
Within the commercial sector, there are five general labor sources or pools that 
can be considered. Thomas F. McCaffery and Carr C. Whitener developed these 
categories in their report entitled Ready Reserve Force Contingency Crewing 
Requirements Study for the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations Logistics Plans and 
Policy/Strategic Sealift Plans Division (Ref. 59: p ES-3). The membership in each pool 
is very fluid and is extremely difficult to give an actual figure to the number of mariners 
in each. 
1. Supportable 
Supportable mariners can be considered to be fully employed, based on the 
number of shipboard billets available and the applicable vacation rotation for these 
billets. 
2. Active/Under-Employed 
Active or under-employed mariners are actively seeking, and dependent upon, 
seagoing employment but are in excess to the number that is supportable by the active 
merchant fleet. They are in the process of deciding whether to find other full time 
employment or accept long-term partial employment. 
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3. Occasional 
Occasional mariners are no longer completely dependent upon seagoing 
employment. They may take advantage of a temporary maritime employment 
opportunity to augment their income while transitioning to full time employment ashore. 
4. Qualified/Non-Active 
Qualified/Non-Active mariners are those who have full time employment ashore 
and are no longer dependant in any way on seagoing employment. However, they have 
not let their licenses or certifications lapse and are still qualified to sail. 
5. Semi-Qualified 
Semi-qualified mariners are individuals much like the above Qualified labor pool 
but who have let their licenses or certifications lapse. While basic skills and knowledge 
are retained, re-licensing/certification and some remedial training would be required 
before they could return to sea. 
The only pool whose size can be determined is the supportable pool because it is 
tied directly to shipboard billets and vacation schedules. The number of mariners in this 
pool can be estimated by simply taking the total required number of crewmembers 
required for each vessel in the fleet and multiplying by a factor, called a vacation factor, 
to account for those sailors on vacation. The other pools cannot be measured with any 
sort of accuracy, and even if the number could be established, the pools are constantly 
changing and any extrapolation would be questionable (Ref. 59:p. ES-3). 
E.       DETERMINING THE ESTABLISHMENT 
The "establishment" is an international term used to describe the total number of 
individuals required to crew a vessel, or fleet of vessels.   There were 7,582 seagoing 
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billets according to MARAD in April 1996 (Ref. 26). In their latest annual report, 
MARAD stated, "In FY 1999, average monthly U.S. seafaring employment in all sectors 
(private, Government contract, Great Lakes) was 10,458 which remained about the same 
as 10,324 in 1998." (Ref. 12:p. 72) The discrepancy between these two numbers is what 
can be considered the "vacation ratio." Currently, the U.S. establishment is three 
mariners for every two billets, or a ratio of 1.5 mariners for every billet (Ref. 26 and 60). 
Taking the 1996 estimate and multiplying by the ratio comes up with a required 
establishment of 11,373 mariners. 
Obviously this number of seagoing jobs fluctuates as the industry grows or 
declines. Appendix I lists the current U.S. flag merchant marine vessels and their 
minimum required crew. This total does not include the Great Lakes vessels, as the 
MARAD numbers do. It also does not include the billets on the literally hundreds of 
tugboat and small inland waterway vessels. However, these sailors are not required to 
obtain unlimited tonnage licenses which allow them to sail ocean-going vessels and 
therefore would not be qualified to man RRF, MPF, or other sealift vessels in case of an 
activation. Additionally, these sailors are not required to attain the STCW certification, 
which will shortly be a requirement for all deep-sea vessels. Great Lakes sailors were 
used to meet the manning issues in the Persian Gulf War and their future value to sealift 
policy cannot be discounted. 
MARAD reported in 1996 that it would require approximately 2,638 mariners to 
fully activate all the vessels in the RRF. Appendix G gives a slightly different number, 
but only differing due to some RRF vessels being transferred to the NDRF and 
replacement vessels being added.   Either way, these numbers represent only the initial 
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crewing of the ships for the surge. Any sort of sustainment operation would require that 
number to be multiplied by the vacation ratio to take into account mariners going on 
leave and vacation. This would bring the total number of mariners required to man the 
RRF to approximately 4000. Table 12 shows these totals. 
Fleet Required Billets (Surge) Ratio 
Establishment 
(Sustainment) 
U.S. Flag Merchant Marine 6,509 1.5 9,764 
FSS 336 1.5 504 
MPF 1,088 1.5 1,632 
Ready Reserve Force 2,506 1.5 3,759 
Total 10,439 Total Establishment 15,659 
Table 13.        Establishment of the U. S. Merchant Marine Industry 
This total is not completely accurate because there is some overlap of vessels 
between the RRF and the MPF and significant discrepancies in the various sources. 
However, it can be shown in the table above that the number of mariners that would be 
required in a sustainment operation is well over 4,000 more than the number that would 
be required for surge operations. Fighting two MTWs is much more likely to involve 
sustainment operations and therefore the higher number of mariners. 
F.        THE MARINER POOL 
Determining the size of the merchant mariner pool is by far the most difficult part 
of the entire equation. Ships can be counted and billets calculated. After all, they cannot 
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go too many places or disappear without a trace. The industry is fluid with ships 
refiagging, being delivered, or being scrapped on a monthly basis. This fluidity is no 
more apparent than in the merchant mariner. Sailors have had the mystique of being 
always on the go and hard to track down. This is not far from the truth in the modern 
merchant marine. As mentioned above, there is no accurate system currently available to 
track the actual number of mariners available to fill the billets either on the commercial 
vessels or the government-owned fleet. Research has uncovered several studies with 
estimates on the number, but without sources as to where that number came from. All 
efforts to obtain estimates were met with suggestions to refer back to these other studies. 
One of the most comprehensive studies on manning the RRF, the McCaffery and 
Whitener study Ready Reserve Force Contingency Crewing Requirements Study, gives 
ample data to show that there is a commercial mariner shortfall, but does not mention 
where the data for the supply side originated from (Ref. 59:p. 1-6,1-11). 
This reported shortage of mariners is not just a problem for the United States. 
The world is facing a similar shortage. As reported by the International Shipping 
Federation in their April 2000 BIMCO/ISF 2000 Manpower Update, the current estimate 
of the worldwide demand for seafarers is 420,000 officers and 599,000 ratings. This was 
calculated using comprehensive data supplied by almost 200 companies, weighted to 
reflect a representative sample of the world fleet. This includes data concerning levels of 
recruitment, the nationality and age structure of seafarers employed, and estimates of the 
number of employees that have taken jobs ashore between 1995 and 2000. The report 
concluded 
The data...shows that this translates into a modest theoretical shortfall of 
officers required to man the world fleet of 16,000 or 4 per cent of the total 
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workforce. For ratings there continues to be a significant overall surplus, 
although there are doubts about the extent to which large numbers of these 
ratings are qualified for international service. (Ref. 61) 
One thing the report does not cover extensively is the methodology used to 
determine the numbers of mariners on the supply side of the equation. The summary 
states the estimate was "produced by amalgamating the most recent national statistics 
provided by authorities in almost all of the principal labour supply countries" (Ref. 61). 
That was the original methodology to be used for this thesis. Contacting all the unions 
and non-union companies and requesting of the number of mariners they employed was 
the most obvious way to estimate the size of the American mariner pool. However, 
efforts to attain information that way proved to be futile and of little help in the research 
for this thesis. 
After extensive research in an attempt to gather data on the number of mariners 
with licenses or qualifications that are currently able to sail, the only thing that was found 
was a general consensus that the mariner pool is insufficient to meet the needs of the 
military sealift fleet during full activation. Recent information has been attained from 
MARAD's Office of Maritime Labor and Training that details the working mariner pool. 
The data comes from actual USCG MMLD data, but is still considered a work in progress 
and has not been officially verified. While the data gives a picture of the mariner pool, it 
does not distinguish between the different licenses and qualifications. It also does not 
specify how many of those actively sailing mariners have unlimited tonnage 
qualifications which would allow them to man the RRF or MPF fleets. Therefore, even 
though the data shows an adequate supply, there still may be shortages in critical billets, 
which is not apparent in the data (Ref. 62). 
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G.       CONCLUSION 
Some members of Congress and the public ask why the Federal Aviation 
Administration can maintain an accurate estimate of pilots currently available to fly but 
the merchant marine can give no solid answer about the number of sailors qualified to go 
to sea. The reasons for this are many. Pilots are not likely to find higher pay outside the 
airline industry so they have no reason to do anything but fly. On average, mariners who 
do sail only sail for part of the year and then disappear to shore-side jobs. Many do not 
go back to sea. Additionally, the airline industry is booming and has been for some time, 
while the exact opposite can be said of the merchant marine. 
One interesting issue brought up by one study suggests that the demand for sailors 
in the commercial fleet may increase even further than it has recently. The Institute for 
Employment Research proposed that manning reductions onboard civilian ships have 
almost reached the minimum possible level, and with the slow growth in the number of 
vessels over the next couple years, will result in more jobs and a higher demand for 
mariners (Ref. 55). This research was focused on the global maritime industry, but can 
also be applied to the United States fleet on a smaller scale. Already civilian companies 
are having problems finding enough mariners to crew their vessels, offering different 
incentives for working, such as training or guaranteed vacation. 
There is a concerted effort by MARAD to create a valid and useable database 
from which data about the employment pool can be more accurately estimated. SEAS 
and MTS are being created to take the ambiguity away from the subject, but will it be 
enough and in time? MARAD has big hopes for the two systems and if given the chance 
and the funding support necessary, they can go a long way toward solving the problem. 
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However, the trend of declining numbers will likely continue unless the various agencies 
and companies can present a unified voice in front of Congress and lobby for a stronger 
merchant marine. All the tracking in the world will not help if there is not a merchant 
marine for these sailors to work on. 
Even if there are enough qualified mariners to man the fleet, a point still 
vehemently debated by many, they may not volunteer.   Therefore, a way to find the 
people willing to sail is essential. Especially with the upcoming STCW requirements, the 
United States will no longer be able to invite the older, retired mariners to return to sea 
and even the unskilled sailors will have to get endorsements and training not previously 
required.  The cost of complying with these new requirements and taking the necessary 
courses may force some casual sailors out of the industry, further reducing the number of 
available mariners.    Some planners bring up the point that, even though it is not 
MARAD's policy, if the need arose the Coast Guard could be petitioned to waive the 
STCW requirements for government-owned vessels.    This would assist in solving a 
manning shortage because the Great Lakes and inland waterway sailors could be tapped. 
However, one important point of this waiver is that if there is no "qualified" reserve pool 
of mariners and the United States crews their vessels with unqualified sailors, these ships 
may be denied access to foreign ports, especially if the host country does not support the 
actions of the United States. As soon as these vessels entered foreign waters, they could 
be impounded for being unseaworthy (Ref. 26).   This is not likely to happen, but it is 
something that military sealift planners must consider. 
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The critical reason for knowing what the mariner employment pool looks like, 
and the need for a viable and accurate tracking system can be summed up by this 
statement from the Maritime Administrator Clyde Hart, Jr.: 
Based on our analysis of mariner data, there are enough qualified active 
seafarers to crew the DOD organic fleet for a short duration, but this could 
dry up much of the pool. An extended mobilization of the entire 
government-owned surge fleet would create pressure to rotate government 
and commercial ship crews, by augmenting the pool with inactive 
mariners. There is likely to be a mismatch between available mariners and 
the specific skills needed to fully activate the DOD organic fleet. We are 
also concerned that shore-side commitments of some of the inactive 
mariners - such as work and family - may keep them from volunteering 
to serve, even with re-employment rights. (Ref. 63) 
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VIII. FINDINGS, RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION 
A.       FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION 
The research for this thesis was challenging from its inception. As the researchers 
delved into the study of the maritime industry, it became readily apparent that although 
concerns over the mariner pool were widespread and well-justified, few seemed to know 
precisely what the requirements were or exactly how many mariners were available. 
Furthermore, while people contacted at various organizations were very knowledgeable 
about the maritime industry, few seemed truly committed to getting to the bottom of the 
problem and some contacts that were provided led to dead ends. All of those contacted 
agreed that the condition of the maritime industry and its role in national security was an 
issue of great concern. The following paragraphs address the findings and 
recommendations from this thesis: 
1. Cargo Capacity 
According to the MRS-05 study, there would be sufficient cargo capacity 
available to meet the requirements of two nearly simultaneous MTWs with the organic 
commercial fleet and a full activation of the government-owned fleet. The MRS-05 study 
included EUSC FoC vessels as well as vessels from allied nations. Based on this study, 
and the amount of cargo capacity contained in the EUSC and allied fleets used in the 
simulation, it can be concluded that even without the allied and EUSC vessels, the U.S. 
fleet could transport all the necessary cargo if required. The main restriction becomes the 
timing involved in the conflicts and the military's desired timeline for getting equipment 
and supplies into the theater of operations. 
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Recommendation: OPNAV N42 should review classification requirements for 
MRS-05 and downgrade sections, if possible, to make the study accessible for research in 
this critical field. MARAD should have access to this study, if such access has not 
already been granted, and if possible undertake verifying the study, tie ships from the 
study to billets, and compare it to mariner availability. Continuing studies should 
compare the cargo capacity required with the capacity available in the government- 
owned fleet. Additionally, an impact analysis could estimate the effects on the United 
States maritime industry of folly activating the RRF and the rest of the government- 
owned fleet. 
2. Merchant Mariner Shortage 
All the studies and articles that were researched for this thesis contend that the 
mariner manpower pool is insufficient to meet the needs of a full, sustained activation of 
the government-owned fleet. The rates and qualifications that are short differ from report 
to report and the actual numbers of this shortage are sketchy if given at all. The data that 
was received was not in a format that could be analyzed to determine where a possible 
shortage would exist. Since, as of right now, there is not an adequate means of tracking 
mariners, this will continue to be a problem and an issue of concern. 
Recommendations - Once MARAD upgrades and updates the Mariner Tracking 
System, efforts should be made to sort the data into the different qualifications and 
licenses, thereby giving a more descriptive picture of the general employment pool. 
From that, areas of deficiencies could be identified. With the assistance of MARAD, 
USCG, and the various maritime schools, steps could be taken to either upgrade 
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qualifications of active mariners or increase the throughput of certain courses. Funding 
for this initiative would be an issue, especially with the current fiscal climate. If 
additional funding for MARAD could be obtained, it would be the ideal agency to be 
responsible, as it could work with the U.S. Merchant Marine Academy and the state 
academies to boost areas deficient in certain licenses. The union schools and Coast 
Guard programs would also have to be considered for extra funding if the deficiencies are 
found within the unlicensed mariners. 
3.        Data Inconsistencies 
One of the unexpected and pervasive findings that came up in the research was an 
extreme amount of variation between different sources for seemingly simple pieces of 
information. For instance, the number of crew required to man a ship differed from 
reputable books such as Jane's Merchant Ships, to the shipping company web page, to 
MARAD's data. Tonnages differed not only in measurement, but also in the unitof 
measurement. Some sources had deadweight tonnage, some had cargo capacity in square 
feet, some in cubic feet, some in Twenty-foot Equivalent Units (TEU), and still others 
simply in gross tonnage. It is understood that different types of vessels measure cargo 
capacity differently due to their method of stowage, but for some vessels, only simple 
measures such as deadweight tonnage were available, while others included multiple 
measures of cargo capacity. The sheer scope of the variation made any sort of 
comprehensive analysis of capacity, billets, or even the ships themselves, nearly 
impossible. 
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Recommendation - Since OPNAV N42 and MARAD work closely with vessel 
capacity data, they should attempt to standardize their studies and publications to include 
capacities in at least the most often used measurement categories if possible. 
Independent publishers, such as Jane's, should be consulted as to their data sources to 
ensure accuracy, standardization of measurements, and presence of all relevant 
information. 
4.        Research Cooperation 
There is little argument that this issue is important to national security and the 
further existence of the U.S. flag merchant fleet. Everyone who was contacted regarding 
this research agreed that this matter required study. However, when it came to actually 
providing data, assisting with data collection, or funding of research trips, with the 
exception of MARAD, few organizations were able to provide more than minor 
assistance. Some agencies flat out refused to even provide a point of contact. This is not 
all encompassing, however. Some agencies went out of their way to assist the research 
and their contribution has been acknowledged. 
Recommendation - MARAD and OPNAV N42 should continue to support and 
even expand research efforts. MSC should take a more active role in this matter, 
especially considering that any results that come out of research conducted should be in 
their interest, given MSC's mission. 
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5. Mariner Tracking 
Without a doubt, the key to being able to meet the future manning requirements 
comes in being able to know how many mariners are available and how to request their 
assistance. MARAD's Mariner Tracking System is vital to this objective. The 
volunteers that agree to this program are the ones who will be called upon to man the 
RRF and surge/sustainment vessels in the next activation. Whether or not they will show 
is a matter for debate. Providing them with incentives for their participation is another 
issue to be brought up. Regardless, this system can give sealift planners an idea of the 
available personnel. 
Recommendation - MARAD needs to continue refining the MTS database to 
give breakdowns of the qualifications that may be in short supply and to separate the 
unlimited licensed mariners from the limited tonnage licenses, which may be of limited 
value during a full-scale activation. The USCG needs to continue their support of the 
system and provide MARAD with downloads from their Licensing Database. The USCG 
should also undertake an effort to cleanse and update this database that reportedly has 
over a quarter million records. With the technology currently available, it should not be 
too expensive or difficult to install a program that could clear up the database and make it 
more useful to the USCG, MARAD, and any other agencies that might find the data 
useful. 
6. Merchant Mariner Documents 
One alternate solution to the mariner tracking issue could come through using the 
magnetic strip on the back of the Merchant Mariner's Document (MMD).   This is an 
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identification card that all licensed and unlicensed mariners are required to carry. In fact, 
no one may be employed on a U.S. Flag vessel of over 100 tons without a valid MMD. 
Prior to 1995, the MMD was a huge card that many had trouble even fitting into their 
wallets. All the information on it was hand typed by the Coast Guard Licensing Office. 
In 1995 the card was modernized, and now has the size and appearance of other 
identification cards, and now includes a fingerprint and magnetic strip. That magnetic 
strip could be a key to tracking sailors. 
When a mariner steps onboard a vessel for employment, the Purser or Chief Mate 
could swipe the card and the information imprinted on the strip could make up the crew 
list required by the Coast Guard. This list could then be sent electronically to the 
shipping company, unions, and MARAD so they have an almost real-time count on who 
is sailing on what vessel. This could be input into the MTS and the available number of 
non-sailing mariners updated. Additionally, when a sailor goes into a union hall, they 
would be able to swipe their card there as well. This could give MARAD additional data 
on mariners available and willing to sail but not currently on a ship. 
Recommendation - MARAD and USCG should look into the feasibility of an 
automated tracking system for mariners. Such a project would require updating the 
capabilities of the MTS, something MARAD is already planning. It would also require 
the Coast Guard to use the magnetic strip to imprint the mariner's data on the MMD. The 
shipping companies and unions would be investing in relatively simple technology that 
would also help them with mariner tracking, vacation calculations, and billet fills. 
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7.        Mariner Reemployment Rights 
A major concern of mariners who answer a call-up and sail on the 
surge/sustainment fleet is retaining their previous jobs. The armed forces reserve 
components all have what are called reemployment rights that give reservists who are 
called into service the right to their old job once their call-up has ended. The lack of 
established reemployment rights for civilian mariners has raised many doubts regarding 
mariners and their willingness to answer a call up if they were concerned about regaining 
their previous job upon their return from sailing. Reemployment rights were one of the 
recommendations made after Desert Shield/Storm. With the passage of the Maritime 
Security Act of 1996, U.S. seafarers in time of war or national emergency now have the 
same basic reemployment rights as the military reserve components (Ref. 26) 
What was not considered when the act was passed is the continuing decline of the 
maritime industry and the fact that many U.S. merchant mariners may be working on 
vessels operating under a foreign flag. These sailors would not have the same basic 
reemployment rights as sailors on U.S. flag vessels. 
Recommendations - The Secretary of Transportation and MARAD must 
continue to support re-employment rights and possibly pursue negotiations with foreign 
flag companies to establish re-employment rights for American merchant mariners sailing 
on their vessels. 
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B.   RECOMMENDATION FOR AREAS OF FURTHER STUDY 
1.        Potential Research Questions 
As the U.S. flag fleet continues to decline, should graduates of maritime schools 
be allowed to sail on foreign flag vessels in order to maintain license requirements and 
obtain the necessary practical experience? 
How can the data on the maritime industry be coordinated and brought into a 
unified and agreed upon form and content? 
A costftenefit analysis of improving MARAD's Mariner Tracking System to be 
able to use the magnetic strip on the MMD to gain real-time tracking of sailing mariners. 
What possible future maritime policy measures can be developed to help maintain 
the American flag merchant fleet? 
2.        Potential Future Studies 
Should the Navy, MSC, or MARAD receive additional funding to help subsidize 
a qualified reserve pool of mariners? Would such a program be effective? 
How will the full implementation of the STCW requirements affect the qualified 
mariner pool? 
What is the current U.S. shipyard industry situation and what can be done to 
rebuild its strength and influence in the maritime industry? 
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C.       CONCLUSION 
The consequences of letting the decline of the maritime industry continue will no 
doubt be detrimental to this country. But more importantly, the national strategy may be 
crippled without sufficient sealift capability. This shortfall could have tremendous 
consequences if the armed forces are deployed in support of two MTWs and their 
supplies and equipment do not arrive in time or in sufficient quantities. The continued 
neglect of this industry may significantly risk the lives of American personnel and may 
even prevent the United States from achieving its defense objectives, as well as its ability 
to enforce its foreign policy. 
There is a need to study and understand the maritime industry so that solutions 
can be found to the problems that are causing its decline. However, the industry is 
extremely complex and it is difficult to obtain recent and accurate information. Further 
study of this subject must be done and the research would be more productive, and in the 
end more useful, with the full support of a committed sponsor with the influence and 
funds to facilitate successful research. 
While this study did not achieve the original intent of determining whether or not 
there are enough mariners to support the U.S. national security strategy, it hopefully 
consolidated several of the vital issues in the maritime industry and provided a useful 
direction for further research. 
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APPENDIX A      MILITARY SEALIFT COMMAND FLEET 
SHIP NAME CLASS GROSS DWT CREW 
MV 1ST LT ALEX BONNYMAN AK 46,552 19,089 32 
MV 1ST LT BALDEMERO LOPEZ AK 44,330 21,864 38 
MV 1ST LT HARRY L. MARTIN AK 47,777 10,000 36 
MV 1 ST LT JACK LUMMUS AK 44,330 21,864 38 
MV 2ND LT JOHN PBOBO AK 44,330 21,881 38 
USNS ABLE AGOS 3,347 2,613 19 
USNS ALGOL FSS 48,904 25,248 42 
USNS ALTAIR FSS 49,262 25,594 42 
MV AMERICAN CORMORANT AK 38,571 52,092 21 
USNS ANTARES FSS 48,525 24,270 42 
USNS APACHE ATF 902 2,100 16 
USNS ASSERTIVE AGOS 1,914 774 18 
USNS BELLATRIX FSS 48,142 25,914 42 
USNS BIG HORN AO 20,706 29,932 81 
USNS BOB HOPE LMSR 69,365 26,569 29 
USNS BOLD AGOS 1,914 786 18 
USNS BOWDITCH AGS 4,260 1,476 25 
USNS BRUCE C HEEZEN AGS 4,260 1,981 25 
MV BUFFALO SOLDIER AK 41,002 19 • 
USNS BUTTE AE 17,920 9,644 5       ROS Status 
USNS CAPABLE AGOS 1,486 773 18 
SS CAPE JACOB AK 12,693 9,740 36 
USNS CAPELLA FSS 48,143 25,406 42 
MV CAPT. STEVEN L. BENNb I I AK 53,727 25,620 25 
USNS CATAWBA ATF 902 2,100 16 
USNS CHARLTON LMSR 72,737 33,644 29 
USNS COMFORT AH 54,367 44,762 16      ROS Status 
USNS CONCORD AFS 15,240 7,757 125 
MV CPL LOUIS J. HAUGE Jr. AK 46,552 19,089 32 
SS CURTISS AVB 12,450 40 
USNS DAHL LMSR 72,718 33,644 29 
USNS DENEBOLA FSS 48,143 27,337 42 
USNS EFFECTIVE AGOS 3,347 2,613 18 
USNS FISHER LMSR 69,365 26,569 29 
USNS FLINT AE 16,970 9,644 
USNS GILLILAND LMSR 54,035 22,145 29 
SS GOPHER STATE ACS 17,130 33 
USNS GORDON LMSR 54,035 22,145 29 
USNS GUADALUPE AO 20,706 29,932 81 
USNS HAYES AG 3,677 1,047 
USNS HENRY J KAISER AOT 20,706 28,864 
USNS HENSON AGS 4,260 2,291 25 
USNS INDOMITABLE AGOS 1,914 774 18 
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USNS INVINCIBLE 
USNS JOHN ERICSSON 
USNS JOHN LENTHALL 






USNS LEROY GRUMMAN 
USNS LITTLEHALES 
USNS LOYAL 
MV LT COL JOHN D. PAGE 
MV LTC CALVIN P. TITUS 
SS MAJ STEPHEN W. PLESS 
MV MAJOR BERNARD F. FISHER 
USNS MERCY 
USNS MOHAWK 
USNS MOUNT BAKER 
USNS NAVAJO 
USNS NIAGARA FALLS 






MV PFC DEWAYNE T. WILLIAMS 
SS PFC EUGENE A. OBREGON 
MV PFC JAMES ANDERSON Jr. 




MV PVT FRANKLIN J. PHILLIPS 
USNS RAPPAHANNOCK 
USNS RED CLOUD 
USNS REGULUS 
USNS SAN JOSE 
USNS SANTA BARBARA 
USNS SATURN 
USNS SEAY 
SS SGT MATEJ KOCAK 
































































































































































































MV SP5 ERIC G. GIBSON 
USNS SPICA 
USNS STALWART 













LMSR 72,718 33,644 29 
AK 48,780 25,063 25 
AFS 12,359 7,832 107 
AGOS 1,472 774 18 
AK 16,428 17,168 23 
AGS 4,260 2,291 28 
AO 20,706 29,932 81 
AGOS 3,847 2,728 19 
AGOS 1,584 774 19 
AO 20,706 29,932 81 
AG 12,442 6,135 
LMSR 72,718 28,067 29 
AVB 12,450 40 
LMSR 43,325 22,223 29 
AO 20,706 24,433 81 
ARC 14,934 6,853 51 
2,895,499 1,675,310 3,998 
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APPENDIX B      OPERATIONAL DIFFERENTIAL AND 
CONSTRUCTION DIFFERENTIAL SUBSIDY AMOUNTS 1936-99 
1 Fiscal Year CDS ODS Total ODS/CDS 
1936-1955 $251,607,830 $341,109,987 $592,717,817 
1956-1960 $164,687,414 $644,115,146 $808,802,560 
1961 $101,361,086 $150,142,575 $251,503,661 
1962 $138,713,238 $181,918,756 $320,631,994 
1963 $93,417,209 $220,676,685 $314,093,894 
1964 $78,273,410 $203,036,844 $281,310,254 
1965 $86,135,010 $213,334,409 $299,469,419 
1966 $72,018,076 $186,628,357 $258,646,433 
1967 $81,087,566 $175,631,860 $256,719,426 
1968 $96,086,293 $200,129,670 $296,215,963 
1969 $94,010,178 $194,702,569 $288,712,747 
1970 $95,252,247 $205,731,711 $300,983,958 
1971 $135,088,321 $268,021,097 $403,109,418 
1972 $141,698,479 $235,666,830 $377,365,309 
1973 $185,568,541 $226,710,926 $412,279,467 
1974 $198,905,452 $257,919,080 $456,824,532 
1975 $239,795,663 $243,152,340 $482,948,003 
1976 $243,712,448 $386,433,994 $630,146,442 
1977 $218,531,643 $343,875,521 $562,407,164 
1978 $156,009,547 $303,193,575 $459,203,122 
1979 $200,776,929 $300,521,683 $501,298,612 
1980 $265,079,866 $341,368,236 $606,448,102 
1981 $208,113,192 $334,853,670 $542,966,862 
1982 $184,485,217 $400,689,713 $585,174,930 
1983 $84,511,019 $368,194,331 $452,705,350 
1984 $13,694,523 $384,259,674 $397,954,197 
1985 $4,692,013 $351,730,642 $356,422,655 
1986 -$416,673 $287,760,640 $287,343,967 
1987 $420,700 $227,426,103 $227,846,803 
1988 $1,236,679 $230,188,400 $231,425,079 
1989 $212,294,812 $212,294,812 
1990 $230,971,797 $230,971,797 
1991 $217,574,038 $217,574,038 
1992 $215,650,854 $215,650,854 
1993 $215,506,822 $215,506,822 
1994 $212,972,929 $212,972,929 
1995 $199,966,581 $199,966,581 
1996 $164,687,954 $164,687,954 
1997 $121,556,425 $121,556,425 
1998 $36,671,731 $36,671,731 
1999 $16,948,560 $16,948,560 
$3,834,553,116 $10,253,927,527 $13,988,480,654 
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APPENDIX C      VISA ACTIVATION PROCESS 
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APPENDIX D      ORGANIZATIONAL SYSTEMS MODEL 
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APPENDIX E      ORGANIZATIONAL SYSTEMS MODEL APPLIED 
TO THE MERCHANT MARINE INDUSTRY 
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APPENDIX F      DESERT STORM/SHIELD TONNAGE MOVED 
FROM AUGUST 1990 TO MARCH 1991 
August 



































45,954      61,410 
12.91%      8.62% 
888,324    711,335 






























Ready Reserve Force 
Short Tons 0 
% Cargo 0% 
SqFt 0 
Ship Loads 0 
US Flag Commercial 
123,046    103,649 



















55,006 38,262 15,441 
21.83% 11.70% 7.48% 
499,599 587,239 298,606 
7 10 3 
0 33,313 35,084 0 
0.00% 4.68% 11.78% 0% 
0 289,129 161,625 0 
0               3               3 0 
73,513 20,043 12,520 0 
20.65% 2.81% 4.20% 0% 
890,135 380,526 249,639 0 
7 2 2 0 
112,959    195,074    72,963 7,219 
31.73%    27.38%    24.49% 26.53% 
1,373,051 2,309,5761,069,051 53,217 
22             35             14 2 
38,599 115,714 44,077 1,186 
10.84% 16.24% 14.80% 4.36% 
810,474 1,273,138 405,169 Not Avail 
12            19            10 1 
Foreign Flag Commercial 
Short Tons 0 
% Cargo 0% 
SqFt 0 
Ship Loads 0 
TOTAL 
16,755 91,163 33,161 85,000     286,819    114,612    18,805 
6.50% 27.89% 16.07% 23.88%    40.26%    38.48%   69.11% 
269,956 1,776,868 527,496 1,596,313 4,209,0901,437,064 257,187 
5              32             10 29 85 31             4 
Short Tons      253,014     252,013    326,930   206,416    356,025    712,373   297,888   27,210 
Sq Ft 2,681,006   2,985,213 5,298,222 3,054,330 5,558,297 9,172,7943,631,109 310,404 

























THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
128 
APPENDIX G      READY RESERVE FORCE VESSELS 
■:y°<-r '^"£T;^;";'; - '" FY2Ö02-Ö5CREW 
#                 SHIP NAME R-STATUS LICENSED ROS LICENSED SURGE UNLICENSED ROS UNLICENSED SURGE TOTAL 
1 ADMIRAL WM CALLAGHAN 4 5 4 5 12 26 
2 ALATNA 10 10 15 25 
3 AMERICAN OSPREY 30 11 22 33 
4 BANNER NDRF 0 
5 BEAVER STATE 4 5 6 5 22 38 
6 CAPE ALAVA NDRF 0 
7 CAPE ALEXANDER 5 5 6 4 21 36 
8 CAPE ANN 10 11 25 36 
9 CAPE ARCHWAY 10 11 25 36 
10CAPE AVINOF 5 5 6 4 21 36 
11 CAPE BLANCO 5 5 6 4 16 31 
12CAPE BON NDRF 0 
13CAPEBORDA 5 5 6 4 16 31 
14CAPE BOVER 5 5 6 4 16 31 
15CAPE BRETON 10 11 20 31 
16CAPECATWABA NDRF 0 
17CAPE CHALMERS NDRF 0 
18CAPECOD NDRF 0 
19CAPE DECISION 4 5 5 5 12 27 
20CAPE DIAMOND 4 5 5 5 12 27 
21 CAPE DOMINGO 4 5 5 5 12 27 
22CAPE DOUGLAS 4 5 5 5 12 27 
23CAPE DUCATO 4 5 5 5 12 27 
24CAPE EDMONT 4 5 5 5 12 27 
25CAPE FAREWELL 10 11 19 30 
26CAPE FEAR 10 11 19 30 
27CAPE FLATTERY 10 11 19 30 
28CAPE FLORIDA 10 11 19 30 
29CAPE GIBSON 5 5 6 4 17 32 
30CAPE GIRARDEAU 5 5 6 4 17 32 
31 CAPE HENRY 5 5 5 4 15 29 
32CAPE HORN 4 5 5 5 13 28 
33 CAPE HUDSON 4 5 5 5 13 28 
34CAPE INSCRIPTION 5 5 6 4 19 34 
35CAPE INTREPID 4 5 6 5 18 34 
36CAPE ISABEL 5 5 6 4 19 34 
37CAPE ISLAND 4 5 6 5 18 34 
38CAPE JACOB PREPO 36 
39CAPE JOHN 5 5 6 4 21 36 
40CAPE JOHNSON 5 5 6 4 21 36 









47CAPE MENDOCINO 10 
48CAPE MOHICAN 
49CAPE NOME 10 
50CAPE ORLANDO 




















71 GEM STATE 
NDRF 
10 
72GOPHER STATE PREPO 
73GRAND CANYON STATE 
74GREEN MOUNTAIN STATE 
75GULF BANKER NDRF 






80MISSION BUENAVENTURA 20 
81 MISSION CAPISTRANO 20 
82MOUNT WASHINGTON 
10 
84NORTHERN LIGHT NDRF 
85PATRIOT ST./GOLD. BEAR 10 
86PETERSBURG PREPO 
87PIONEER COMMANDER NDRF 





















































































89POTOMAC 10 11 22 
90SCAN NDRF 0 
91 WRIGHT 5              5 6                      4 25 40 
TOTAL: 255 525                   230 1,361 2,506 
|                                           *Prepositioned Vessels Do Not Require Surge Crew                                           | 
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APPENDIX H.     MERCHANT MARINE MANNING STUDIES 1971- 
1995 
1. "Merchant Marine Shipboard Crew Skills & Disciplines Study" Department of 
Defense Study, (Stanwick Corp.), December 1971 
2. "Sealift Procurement and National Security" (SPANS) DOD/MARAD Study, August 
2,1972 
3. "Investigation of the Potential for Increased use of Civilian Manning in Fleet Support 
Ships (CIVMAN)." Chief of Naval Operations (OP-96) Study, (Information 
Spectrum Inc.) January 31,1977 
4. "Civilian Seafaring Manpower Requirements in Peace and War 1978-1984." 
MARAD/MSC Study, November 1978 
5. "Contract Manning vs Civil Service" CNO (OP-04) Study, (Booz-Allen), March 31, 
1982 
6. "Civilian Manning of AE, AFS, and AD Type Support Ships" Vol I, II CNO (OP-96) 
Study (Information Spectrum Inc.), September 29,1982 
7. "Effective Manning of the U.S. Merchant Fleet" National Research Council Study, 
August 1984 
8. "The Reactivation Process for the Ready Reserve Force." Chief of Naval Operations 
(OP-04) Study, (Center for Naval Analysis), December, 1985 
9. "Reserve Fleet Crewing Feasibility 1984-1995" MARAD Study, (Office of Labor 
and Training), April 23,1985 
10. "Merchant Marine Manning Analysis" CNO (OP-42) Study, (Presearch Inc.), March 
14,1986 
11. "Americas Vanishing Merchant Mariners." Transportation Institute, September 1986 
12. "1986 Surge Shipping Requirements" MARAD Study, May 12,1986. 
13. "Ready Reserve Force: Ship Readiness Has Improved, but Other Concerns Remain" 
General Accounting Office Report GAO/NSIAD-95-24, November 1994 
14. "Ready Reserve Force Contingency Crewing Requirements Study." Chief of Naval 
Operations (OP-42) Study (McCaffery & Whitener, Inc.), December 15,1995 
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APPENDIX I       UNITED STATES FLAG MERCHANT FLEET 
Vessel Name Type Year Built Total Licensed 
Total 
Unlicensed 
ADVANTAGE GENERAL 1977 9 13 
ALLEGIANCE TANKER 1980 8 12 


















~ 9  
15 
12  
APL PHILIPPINES GENERAL 1996 9 12 
APL SINGAPORE GENERAL 1995 9 12 





















ARCO SAG RIVER TANKER 1972 9 16 
ARCO SPIRIT TANKER 1977 8 16 
ARCO TEXAS TANKER 1973 8 16 
ARCO TRADER TANKER-DB 1982 9 12 










 17  
AUSTRAL RAINBOW 









BALTIMORE TANKER-DB 1983 8 8 
BARBARA KESSEL BULK 1977 6 6 





















BUFFALO SOLDIER GENERAL 1978 9 14 
CAPTAIN H. A DOWNING TANKER-DH 1957 9 15 
CAPTAIN STEVEN L. BENNETT GENERAL 1984 9 12 
CAROLINA GENERAL 1971 12 16 





















CHESAPEAKE CITY TANKER 1981 9 17 
CHESAPEAKE TRADER TANKER-DB 1982 9 12 












CHEVRON WASHINGTON TANKER-DB 1976 10 10 
CHIEF GADAO GENERAL 1971 10 17 
CHILBAR TANKER 1959 10 18 
CLEVELAND GENERAL 1969 9 15 
COAST RANGE TANKER 1981 10 13 
COASTAL CORPUS CHRISTI TANKER 1960 9 18 







 9  
18 
~ " 18 "  










CONSTITUTiON/OCEAN 280 TANKER 1971 7 8 
CORNUCOPIA TANKER 1958 9 14 
























GENERAL 1974 10 19 
GENERAL 1976 10 19 
ENDEAVOR GENERAL 1997 9 12 
ENDURANCE GENERAL 1997 9 12 


















 8  
15 
16 
FALCON LEADER TANKER 1983 8 14 
FAUST GENERAL 1985 9 12 





















GREEN BAY GENERAL 1987 9 11 
GREEN COVE GENERAL 9 12 
GREEN HARBOUR GENERAL 1974 10 15 
GREEN ISLAND GENERAL 1975 12 20 


















 9  
15 
13 
GROTON TANKER-DB 1982 8 8 
GÜÄDÄLÜPE TANKER 1945 9 
12 
16 
GUAYAMA GENERAL 1969 16 
GUS W DARNELL 







HMI AS'i RACHEM 









HMI DEFENDER TANKER 1969 9 14 
136 
HMIDYNACHEM TANKER-DB 1981 9 14 
HMI PETROCHEM TANKER-DB 1981 9 14 
HMI TRADER TANKER 1945 9 17 
HOWELL LYKES GENERAL 1973 11 21 
HUMACAO GENERAL 1968 12 16 




































































 "13  
LAWRENCE H GIANELLA TANKER 9 14 
LEADER TANKER 1969 9 15 
LIBERTY SEA BULK 1984 9 12 
LIBERTY SPIRIT BULK 1986 9 12 








 9  
12 








 12  
17 
16 
LNG ARIES TANKER 1977 12 16 
LNG CAPRICORN TANKER 1978 12 16 





LTC. CALVIN P. TITUS GENERAL 1985 9 13 
LURLINE GENERAL 1973 10 18 
LYKES ADVENTURER GENERAL 1984 9 13 
LYKES DICOVERER GENERAL 1987 9 12 


















 9  
12 
12 
MAERSK COLORADO GENERAL 1997 9 12 
MAERSK CONSTELLATION GENERAL 1980 9 12 








 9  
12 
12  










MANUKAI GENERAL 1970 10 18 
137 
MANULANI GENERAL 1970 10 17 
MARGARET B. CHOUEST GENERAL 1995 7 6 
MARINE CHEMIST TANKER 1970 10 19 
MARINE COLUMBIA TANKER 1974 10 
8 
15 
MARINE DUVAL TANKER 1944 17 
MARY BAY TANKER 1970 9 12 
MATSONIA 

















 " 8~ "  
16 
" 8~ "' 
MOKIHANA GENERAL 1983 9 12 
MOKU PAHU BULK 1982 7 8 








 9  
16 








 8  
15 
8  
NEWARK BAY GENERAL 1985 9 12 
NOBLE STAR GENERAL 1977 9 13 
NORTHERN LIGHTS GENERAL 1975 9 20 
NUEVO SAN JUAN GENERAL 1970 12 16 


















 9  
15 
i"3  
OVERSEAS JOYCE IGENERAL 1987 9 12 
OVERSEAS JUNEAU TANKER 1973 10 15 



















 8  
15 
13 
OVERSEAS VIVIAN TANKER 1969 10 15 
OVERSEAS WASHINGTON TANKER-DB 1978 10 15 
PATRIOT TANKER 1976 9 12 
PAUL BUCK TANKER 9 14 






















PRESIDENT GRANT GENERAL 9 12 
PRESIDENT HOOVER GENERAL 1989 9 12 


















 9  
12 
12 
PRESIDENT WILSON GENERAL 1989 9 12 
138 
PRINCE WILLIAM SOUND TANKER-DB 1975 11 17 
R.J. PFEIFFER GENERAL 1992 9 12 
RESOLUTE GENERAL 1980 10 17 
RICHARD G MATTHIESEN TANKER 9 14 
ROBERT E. LEE GENERAL 1974 12 20 
ROVER TANKER 1977 9 12 
S/R BATON ROUGE 
S/R BAYTOWN 
TANKER 




 9  
12 








 To  
13 
"" 13"  
S/R GALVESTON TANKER 1970 8 11 
S/R LONG BEACH TANKER 1987 9 12 
S/R MEDITERRANEAN TANKER 1986 10 13 













TANKER   ~ 
1974 12 
 9 ' 
20 
14 
SANDY BAY GENERAL 1969 9 12 
SEA ISLE CITY TANKER 1981 9 12 
SEA PRINCESS TANKER 1972 9 15 
SEA VENTURE TANKER-DB 1972 9 11 
SEABULK AMERICA TANKER 1975 8 9 
SEABULK 
CHALLENGER/STL390 TANKER 1975 8 9 
SEABULK 








 9  
12 











SEALAND COMMITMENT GENERAL 1985 9 12 
SEA-LAND CONSUMER GENERAL 1973 11 16 
SEA-LAND CRUSADER GENERAL 1969 11 15 
SEA-LAND DEFENDER GENERAL 1980 9 12 





















SEA-LAND EXPLORER GENERAL 1980 9 12 
SEA-LAND EXPRESS GENERAL 1980 9 12 


















 9  
12 
12 
SEA-LAND KODIAK GENERAL 1987 9 12 
SEA-LAND LIBERATOR GENERAL 1980 9 12 
SEA-LAND NAVIGATOR GENERAL 1972 11 15 
SEALAND OREGON GENERAL 1985 9 12 
SEA-LAND PACIFIC GENERAL 1979 11 15 
139 
SEA-LAND PATRIOT GENERAL 1980 9 12 
SEA-LAND PERFORMANCE GENERAL 1985 9 12 
SEA-LAND PRODUCER GENERAL 1974 11 14 
SEA-LAND QUALITY GENERAL 1985 9 12 
SEA-LAND RELIANCE GENERAL 1980 11 15 


















 1976  
12 
12 
STONE BUCCANEER TANKER 1985 4 4 
STONEWALL JACKSON GENERAL 1974 12 20 








 9  
4 








 9  
11 
12 
TELLUS GENERAL 1978 9 10 
THE MONSEIGNEUR TANKER-DH 1960 9 15 
THOMPSON LYKES IGENERAL 1974 11 21 
THOMPSON PASS TANKER 1978 10 19 










 9  
18 
 4 








WILSON GENERAL 1969 11 23 
ZORRA/CALRICE BULK 1976 8 
2,528 
11 
TOTAL BILLETS AVAILABLE 3,981       | 
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